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Imputed Criminal Liability
Typically, the set of elements defining a crime comprise what may be
called the paradigm of liability for that offense: An actor is criminally
liable if and only if the state proves all these elements.' The paradigm of
an offense, however, does not always determine criminal liability. Even
where all the elements of the paradigm are proven, rules and doctrines
create exceptions that affect criminal liability. Some exceptions, suc i as
insanity, duress, and law enforcement authority, can exculpate an actor
even though his conduct and state of mind satisfy the paradigm for the
offense charged. Such exculpating exceptions are grouped and analyzed as
defenses.
2
Other exceptions inculpate actors who do not satisfy the paradigm for
the offense charged. Such inculpating exceptions may be termed instances
of "imputed" elements of an offense. Some writers have suggested that the
imposition of liability absent a required element of the offense is illogical,3
immoral,4 or perhaps unconstitutional.' But just as there are many de-
fenses-exceptions that exculpate despite satisfaction of the para-
digm-there are also many common and well-established exceptions that
inculpate despite the absence of a "required" element of the offense defi-
nition. If, for example, an actor causes another person to engage in illegal
conduct, a required element of conduct of the offense may be properly
1. As used here, "paradigm" refers to the paradigm for a particular offense, e.g., arson, rape, or
murder. Each offense has its own paradigm, which can nearly always be determined by examining the
offense definition. There are, however, exceptions to this simple methodology. Certain offense defini-
tions incorporate exceptions to the paradigm. See infra note 6. Further, certain offenses are not state-
ments of the paradigm but rather are codified exceptions to the paradigm of another offense. See infra
pp. 624-29.
2. See generally I P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 11-41 (1984) (discussing system of
defenses and its practical implications); Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLum. L. REV. 199, 203 (1982) (grouping defenses into failure of proof, offense modification, justi-
fications, excuses, and public policy defenses).
3. Compare Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, 360 (Hailsham,
L.J.) (logic requires jury instruction permitting finding that intoxication negates any element of of-
fense) with Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142, 157 (Salmon, L.J.)
(logical requirement that prosecution must prove every element of offense cannot prevail where de-
fendant's voluntary intoxication has caused absence of element) and id. at 166-68 (Edmund-Davies,
LJ.) (same).
For a scholarly discussion of the illogic of conviction absent proof of a required element, see G.
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 569-72 (2d ed. 1961); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.08 comment at 6-7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). It is, however, unprincipled imputation, and not
imputation itself, that is illogical and immoral. See infra pp. 639-42.
4. See J. SMrrH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 37 (3d ed. 1973) (arguing that voluntarily intoxi-
cated who cannot control their conduct should not be punished); cf. Majewski, 2 All E.R. at 168-71
(Edmund-Davies, L.J.) (recognizing but rejecting moral objections to conviction absent required cul-
pable state of mind).
5. The due process clause, for example, requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). If one interprets this to mean that every element of the definition
of the offense charged must be proven, every form of imputed liability discussed in this Article could
be unconstitutional unless written into the definition of the particular offense. The constitutionality of
most of these doctrines, however, is undisputed.
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imputed to the actor. Similarly, the requisite culpable state of mind may
properly be imputed to an actor if he would have had the culpable state of
mind but for his voluntary intoxication. These familiar results follow from
special rules governing complicity and voluntary intoxication. Like the de-
fenses of insanity, duress, and law enforcement authority, which also gen-
erally appear outside the definition of an offense, these rules of imputation
alter the requirements for criminal liability.
Legislators could conceivably include all inculpatory exceptions to a
particular paradigm within the definition of the offense.' Inculpatory ex-
ceptions, however, often embody principles that are independent of any
particular offense.7 Such general principles of inculpation provide an al-
ternative basis for liability; they justify liability in the absence of every
element of the offense. These general principles make it unnecessary to
refer to the doctrines of imputation in the definition of each offense.8
6. Arson, for example, is defined in Tennessee to include in complicity "[any person who will-
fully and maliciously sets fire to or burns, causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the
burning of any house ...shall be guilty of arson ...." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-202 (1982)
(emphasis added); see also W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1977) (arson committed by one who burns or aids,
counsels, or procures burning of house). Similarly, definitions of an offense sometimes incorporate the
rules governing voluntary intoxication, and impose liability even though intoxication may negate an
otherwise required culpable state of mind:
(a) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) recklessly causes the death of an individual; or
(2) by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and,
by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an individual.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 1974) (emphasis added).
The paradigm of liability for arson under the Tennessee statute, generally requires proof that the
actor set fire to or burnt the house. If the actor aids, counsels, or procures another to do the burning,
however, that act is imputed. Similarly, the paradigm for manslaughter under the Texas statute in-
dudes recklessness, but this element is imputed if the actor causes death if driving while intoxicated.
In either case, a required element of the offense is eliminated, and liability is instead supported by a
combination of the remaining elements of the paradigm and the special requirements of complicity
(for arson) or intoxication (for manslaughter).
Some general formulations of rules governing complicity and voluntary intoxication contain explicit
provisions for imputation. The Model Penal Code, for example, does so in its complicity provision: "A
person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another
person for which he is legally accountable, or both." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962). Thus, if accountability is established, another's conduct may be imputed. The Model
Penal Code provision governing voluntary intoxication is similar: "When recklessness establishes an
element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he
would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial." Id. § 2.08(2).
7. For example, aiding and abetting is so firmly entrenched as a doctrine applicable to all offenses
that federal courts have recognized that the federal complicity provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), is "an
alternative charge in every count, whether explicit or implicit." United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88,
95 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Bryan
case illustrates two significant characteristics of most doctrines of imputation: They are alternative
charges, because the conditions for liability are different from the elements of the offense charged; and
they have applicability beyond the offense charged. See Bryan, 483 F.2d at 95 (conviction under
indictment charging aiding and abetting permissible even though proof at trial established that defend-
ant acted as principal). For a discussion of the elements of complicity, i.e., the prerequisites to imputa-
tion of elements of conduct under this theory, see infra p. 633 (contribution to offense); p. 637 (culpa-
ble state of mind as to contribution); note 102 (culpability required by offense).
8. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-303 (1982) (aiders and abettors deemed principal offenders).
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Recognition of the conceptually distinct group of inculpating exceptions
not only reveals the functional similarity of a variety of inculpatory rules
and doctrines but also raises a crucial theoretical issue in each instance of
imputation. If the minimum requirements for an offense have been de-
fined in its paradigm, why should one of these "required" elements be
eliminated in a particular case? All instances of imputed elements, while
they may be founded upon reasonable grounds for imposing liability, per-
mit deviation from the previously defined minimum requirements for a
given offense. At the very least, such deviation requires an explanation.
Defenses-exceptions that redound to the defendant's benefit-are sup-
ported by well-developed and rational explanations. 9 Can we also articu-
late sound theoretical and practical. reasons supporting the well-
established inculpating exceptions?
The rules and doctrines that impute required elements have no common
name to draw them together, as do "defenses," and, perhaps for this rea-
son, have rarely been viewed as a group. Having defined instances of im-
putation as a conceptual group, however, one may ask whether there is an
identifiable and consistent set of principles that governs the imputation of
definitional elements. Are the rules governing such imputation consistent
with their rationales? Do doctrines or rules with similar rationales oper-
ate in properly analogous ways to produce consistent results? These are
the inquiries undertaken in this Article.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF IMPUTED LIABILITY
American criminal law permits the imputation of both the objective and
culpability elements of a crime. While the most obvious and common in-
stances of imputing objective elements are found in the rules governing
complicity, 10 such rules are only one of several seemingly dissimilar doc-
Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 1974) (discussed supra note 6) with id. §
8.04(a) (voluntary intoxication is no defense to crime). The general imputation provisions in both the
Tennessee and Texas statutes create liability in all cases included in the specific imputation provisions
of the arson and manslaughter offenses, quoted supra note 6. Thus, the specific offense approach is
unnecessary in both cases.
9. Excuses, such as insanity and duress, apply where the actor is not responsible for the criminal
conduct because of his disability. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 221, 225. Excuses ensure that only
those who are blameworthy and deterrable-those who violate the law through a meaningful exercise
of free will-will be punished. Id. at 221 & n.81. Justifications, such as self-defense and law enforce-
ment, apply where the harm of the actor's criminal conduct is, under the special circumstances, out-
weighed by the benefit it creates. Id. at 213-20. Justifications ensure that conduct that creates a net
benefit is both recognized as harmless under such circumstances and encouraged in the future. Id. at
213-14.
10. If A holds B's baby while B takes C's property, A may be guilty of theft. Under normal
complicity rules, the objective element required for theft, the "taking," may be imputed to A. See State
v. Duran, 86 N.M. 594, 526 P.2d 188 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187 (1974).
Further, where an offense contains a result element and the conduct and result elements are imputed
to an accomplice, the causation element is also imputed. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 480 Pa. 524,
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trines that impose liability even though the defendant has not satisfied all
the objective elements of an offense.
Where an actor exercises control over an innocent person's actions, the
latter's satisfaction of an objective element of an offense may be imputed
to the former as an instance of "causing crime by an innocent.""1 The
doctrines of "substituted objective elements"12 and "transferred actus
reus"'1 impute objective elements to an actor who, for example, burglar-
izes a store thinking it a dwelling and to an actor who intends to shoot
someone other than his actual victim, respectively. Statutory and judicial
presumptions permit the imposition of liability even though the evidence
adduced at trial would not establish all the objective elements of the of-
fense.24 Moreover, one could argue that rules imposing liability for omis-
391 A.2d 1009 (1978) (where complicity is established, proof that principal caused death suffices to
establish liability).
The rules of complicity generally impute the objective elements of the offense charged upon a show-
ing of the actor's contribution to the criminal venture, the actor's culpability as to his contribution,
and the culpable state of mind necessary for the commission of the offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.06(3)-(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring solicitation, aid, agreement or attempt to aid,
with purpose of promoting or facilitating offense, and imposing special requirements for culpability
for result). For a discussion and criticism of these and similar provisions, see Robinson & Grail,
Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 681, 736-44 (1983).
Some complicity rules also impute a required mental state of the offense. See infra pp. 617-18.
11. The Model Penal Code provides: "A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another
person when ...acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct .... " MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Although the precise statutory requirements for liability under § 2.06(2)(a) are less than clear, the
objective elements of the offense charged appear to be imputed upon a showing of causation, see infra
p. 631-32, recklessness or knowledge as to causing the innocent's conduct, see infra p. 638, and the
culpable state of mind necessary for commission of the offense charged.
12. An illustration of "substituted objective elements" follows. If A believes he is burglarizing a
store while he in fact burglarizes a dwelling (a different offense), he may be convicted of the offense of
burglarizing a store even though an element of the offense, "store," is not satisfied. The existence of a
comparable objective element in the actual offense, "dwelling," is used as a justification for imputing
the required objective element of the offense charged. This was the approach originally adopted and
later rejected by the drafters of the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2) comment 2 at
137 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). For a further discussion and illustration of the imputation provided by
§ 2.04(2), see 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 62 n.33.
13. Where A shoots at B but hits C, the objective element of the death of C may be "transferred"
to justify holding A liable for the intentional homicide of B, at whom he was shooting. See
Mayweather v. State, 29 Ariz. 460, 462, 242 P. 864, 865 (1926). Such "transferred actus reus" is an
alternate, although uncommon, method for dealing with cases typically analyzed in terms of "trans-
ferred intent."
14. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-507 (1982) (presumption of manufacture of moonshine from
assembly of still). For a list demonstrating the variety of statutory and judicial presumptions imputing
objective elements, see infra note 163.
The term "presumptions" is used throughout this Article to refer to statutory and judicially created
rules based on the existence of a logical relationship between sets of facts. As employed here, the term
includes rules that others have labeled presumptions, assumptions, and inferences. See Ashford &
Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overtiew,
79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Hug, Presumptions and Inferences in Criminal Law, 56 MIL. L. REV. 81
(1972).
While for the most part, presumptions create only an evidentiary inference that can in theory be
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sions, 5 when the offense charged is defined only in terms of affirmative
conduct, are also instances of imputed elements of conduct."8
Thus, a variety of rules and doctrines impute unsatisfied objective ele-
ments of the offense charged. Similarly, a diverse group of doctrines im-
pute a culpable state of mind.17 The most common of these doctrines
shapes the law governing voluntary intoxication: Voluntary intoxication,
coupled with the objective elements of the offense, establishes liability de-
spite the absence of some required mental elements.18 The doctrine of
"transferred intent" would impute a culpable state of mind to an actor
who intends to harm one person but actually harms another.19 An analo-
rebutted by the defendant, as a practical matter the existence of the presumption frequently results in
imputation because the defendant often is unable to rebut it. See Ashford & Risinger, supra, at
194-203 (describing impact of mandatory presumptions as dependent upon amount of evidence re-
quired to rebut and impact of "permissive" presumptions as dependent upon weight given). On the
effect of a rebutted presumption, see 1 E. MORGAN, BASIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 33-35 (1954); J.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 336-39 (1898); Ashford
& Risinger, supra, at 167-70; Hug, supra, at 84.
15. Liability for an omission is generally imposed only if the actor has a duty to perform the
omitted conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The duty
may arise from the actor's relationship with the victim, from a statute independent of the offense
charged that imposes a duty to act, or from the actor's creation of the dangerous circumstances. The
actor must be aware of the circumstances giving rise to the duty, see W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 26, at 187 (1972), and must have the culpability required by the
definition of the offense, see id. § 2, at 7. There must also be a causal relationship between the
omission and the prohibited result. See id. § 26, at 189.
Imputation of conduct based on satisfaction of these special conditions should be distinguished from
offenses explicitly defined to punish omissions, e.g., failure to provide support. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 230.5 (1980). The latter do not involve imputation; the true harm they prohibit is the
omission.
16. See United States v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 437-38 (D.N.J. 1976). But see W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, § 26, at 183 (nothing in definition of homicide suggests that
offense may or may not be committed by omission). A rule permitting liability without a special
doctrine would violate the well-established notice and specificity requirements of the legality principle.
See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 184, at 575-76. The vagueness doctrine imposes similar limitations
on the legislature's authority to define offenses. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389-90 (1979)
(abortion statute void for vagueness because ambiguity in definition of viability failed to notify physi-
cians when duty arises).
17. This Article uses the phrase "culpable state of mind" to refer to any level of culpability, i.e.,
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. The phrase is a useful shorthand device, see W.
LAFAVE & A. Scowr, supra note 15, § 2, at 5 n.2, and it comports with current statutory language,
see Robinson & Grail, supra note 10, at 683 n.7.
18. See State v. Barrett, 408 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1979) (defendant convicted of arson after having set
fire to duplex after drinking heavily). Although arson required a "conscious disregard of a substantial
risk that his conduct would endanger any person or damage or destroy the property of another," M.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802(1)(B)(2) (1983), the court held any unawareness was immaterial,
see id. § 37(2) (1983) (formerly id. § 58-A(2) (1979)) (unawareness of risk immaterial where reck-
lessness is required and actor is unaware of risk because of voluntary intoxication. Cf. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted supra note 6). Such statutes permit voluntary
intoxication to negate purpose or knowledge but not recklessness.
19. Where A intends to shoot X but misses and kills Y, the intention to kill X is "transferred" to
Y. People v. Forrest, 133 Ill. App. 2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813 (1971), illustrates this doctrine. Defendant
announced his intention to shoot at the next passing car containing whites. When that time came,
however, his hand slipped, and he shot and killed one of his friends. He was convicted of the murder
of his friend despite the dear absence of intent to kill the deceased. The Court concluded, "an intent
to kill deceased may be imputed from the existence and proof of an intent to kill another." Id. at
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gous doctrine permits suspension of the requirement of concurrence. It
imputes an actor's earlier intention to commit an act that he believes is an
offense to his later conduct constituting the offense.2 Imputation is also
accomplished through a device that might be termed "substituted mental
elements."21  The doctrine substitutes an actor's intention regarding the
offense he thought he was committing for the intention required for the
offense he in fact committed. The mental element present justifies the im-
72-73, 272 N.E.2d at 815.
The need for a doctrine of transferred intent is clear under modem codes. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.1 (1980) (homicide defined as "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently caus[ing] the
death of another"); Id. § 2.03(2)-(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring culpability as to "ac-
tual result" in typical case).
This doctrine of imputation is not limited to transfer of intent. See J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra
note 4, at 49-51 (discussing transferred malice); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 126-28 (same). Nor
has it been limited to homicide: Under modern codes the doctrine is applicable to every offense that
requires culpability as to a result. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(a), (3)(a) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (imputing requisite purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence as to "actual" result
if it differs from result designed, contemplated, risked, or ignored only in that different person or
different property is injured or affected); accord ALA. CODE § 13A-2-5(b)(1) (1982); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-203(B)(1), (C)(1) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 262(1), 263(1) (1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 702-215(1), -216(1) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 501.060(2)(a), (3)(a) (1975);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-201(2)(a), (3)(a) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-3(d) (West 1982); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 303(b)(1), (c)(1) (Purdon 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(2)
(Vernon 1974).
20. Thus, where A wounds B and, thinking B is dead, attempts to dispose of what he believes is
B's body, A's earlier intention to kill B is imputed to A at the time he causes B's death by disposing
of the body. See Thabo Meli v. Regina (High Ct. of Basutoland 1953), appeal dismissed sub norm.
Meli v. Regina, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 228, 230, [1954] 1 All E.R. 373, 374.
In instances of suspension of the concurrence requirement, the imputed intention and the actual
intention do not differ in their object, as in transferred intent cases, only in time.
The concurrence principle is codified in several contemporary penal codes. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 20 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 18-114 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 193.190 (1979). It seems
implicit in the statement of the general requirements of culpability in other codes. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Failure to satisfy the concurrence requirement typically results in acquittal. See, e.g., Jackson v.
State, 102 Ala. 167, 170, 15 So. 344, 345 (1894) (one who breaks and enters and afterwards forms
intent to steal has not committed burglary); State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55, 60, 357 P.2d 656, 659
(1960) (larceny not established where defendant accidentally took another's chattel, later realized it
was not his, and then decided not to return it); Commonwealth v. Spallone, 267 Pa. Super. 486, 488,
406 A.2d 1146, 1147 (1979) (one who kills another accidentally and then decides to take deceased's
money has not committed felony murder). But see State v. Craig, 82 Wash. 2d 777, 781-83, 514 P.2d
151, 154-55 (1973) (conviction for felony murder not precluded by defendant's lack of intent to rob at
time of killing, because he had previously had intent during same transaction).
21. Under § 2.04(2) of the Model Penal Code and similar provisions in state codes, if A believes
he is burning a store but in fact bums a dwelling-a different offense-he may be held liable for
burning a dwelling even though he does not satisfy the required mental element of the offense. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Although ignorance or mistake
would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant
would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed."); accord IDAHO CODE §
18-307 (1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 33 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 208.070(2) (1977);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 43 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-4-2 (1979). A defend-
ant may intend to commit a crime which is lesser, greater, or equal in seriousness and blameworthi-
ness to the crime charged. The prosecution may charge the defendant with having violated the greater,
lesser, or equal offense. For a further discussion of such provisions and an illustration of the imputa-
tion it effectuates, see 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 62 n.32.
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putation of the mental element of the offense charged. Finally, as with the
objective elements, a variety of statutory and judicial presumptions effec-
tively impute required mental elements.22
Other rules can impute both objective and mental elements. If A and B
conspire to rob a bank and B purposely kills a guard, both the killing and
the purposeful culpability may be imputed to A under the Pinkerton doc-
trine.23 The "natural and probable consequence" rule in complicity law
analogously expands the liability of accomplices.2 4 Similarly, the complic-
22. Some presumption statutes that impute objective elements, see infra note 163, also impute
mental elements. For example, possession of a still has been used to presume both the manufacture (or
attempt to manufacture) and the required intention to manufacture whiskey. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
1-507 (1982) (presuming manufacture from assembly of still).
Commonly, however, presumptions impute only required mental elements. For example, proof of
unlawful entry into a building may trigger a rebuttable presumption of the intent to commit larceny
required for burglary. NEv. REv. STAT. § 205.065 (1981). Dissemination or possession of obscene
material in the course of business may trigger a presumption of the knowing or reckless possession for
sale or dissemination required for conviction. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(2) (1980). Judicially
created presumptions are also common. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1978) (dis-
cussing constitutionality of presumption that persons intend natural and probable consequences of
their actions); United States v. Reynolds, 573 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1978) (statute prohibiting willful
misapplication of bank funds "presumes" intent to defraud upon proof of reckless disregard of bank's
interest); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 370-82, 251 A.2d 99, 104-08 (1969) (knowledge that goods
are stolen may be presumed upon unexplained possession of recently stolen goods).
23. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946) (member of conspiracy is liable for
all offenses committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of conspiracy). Pinkerton liability is typically
limited to offenses that are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy. See infra note 226.
24. Under vicarious liability, "an accessory is liable for any criminal act which in the ordinary
course of things was the natural or probable consequence of the crime that he advised or commanded,
although such consequence may not have been intended by him." 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 92
(1961). The natural and probable consequence rule is codified in several jurisdictions. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 939.05(2)(c) (West 1982); ef. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.2 (West 1979) (accomplice liable for
acts of co-felon unless accomplice "could not reasonably expect [act] to be done" in furtherance of
initial offense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205 (1981) (liable if act reasonably foreseeable consequence
of crime); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57.3 (19 3) ("reasonably foreseeable consequence" of
"conduct"). Even without statutory authority, courts have employed the natural and probable conse-
quence rule to impute both mental and objective elements. See, e.g., United States v. Clayborne, 509
F.2d 473, 475, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (murder by defendant Clayborne in course of chase was natural
and probable consequence of defendant Brown's participation in criminal venture; proof that Brown
shared Clayborne's intention to kill therefore not required); Johnson v. United States, 386 A.2d 710,
713 (D.C. 1978) (defendant liable for natural and probable consequence of initiating fight with victim
regardless of intent regarding result).
The Model Penal Code's complicity provision and those patterned after it, however, reject the
natural and probable consequence rule, and impose liability for confederate's offense only when the
normal complicity requirements are met. The Model Penal Code provides:
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or com-
mitting it;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); accord HAWAII REv. STAT. § 702-
222 (1976); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.041 (Vernon 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.155 (1981); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(c) (Purdon 1983). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment 2, at 26
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) (accomplice's liability should not extend beyond criminal purposes he
shares or knows) (currently § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). See infra p. 638.
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ity aspect of the felony-murder rule imputes both objective and culpability
elements in homicide cases.25 Finally, vicarious liability,28 and its special
subclass governing the liability of officials of organizations,2 ' imputes cer-
tain elements because of a continuing relationship between the perpetrator
and the defendant. This is not an exhaustive list of the instances of
imputation.
28
25. Typically, the complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule imputes both the conduct and the
mental state of the killer co-felon to his accomplices. See People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 57,
87 P.2d 364, 366 (1939) (all co-defendants held liable for intentional killing of one co-defendant by
another during felony). When the killer co-felon does not have the culpability required for murder,
the aggravation of culpability aspect of the felony-murder rule imputes that state of mind to the killer,
and the complicity aspect of the rule imputes both the killing and culpability to the co-felons. For a
discussion of the aggravation of culpability under the felony-murder rule, see infra pp. 624-26. Sev-
eral jurisdictions codify both aspects of the felony-murder imputation. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25(3) (McKinney 1975). The Model Penal Code's substitute for the felony-murder rule, see infra
p. 625, does not codify the complicity aspect of the rule. It imputes liability for the homicidal conduct'
of a co-felon only where normal complicity rules would do so. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b)
(1980) ("recklessness and indifference [as to causing death] are presumed if the actor is engaged or is
an accomplice in the commission of [certain enumerated felonies]"); id. comment 6 at 30.
26. In this Article, vicarious liability denotes instances where the defendant is held liable for an
offense committed by another even though the defendant lacked the culpability required for the of-
fense and did not satisfy the objective elements of the offense.
The continuing relationship necessary for vicarious liability may be found in a parent-child rela-
tionship, see State v. Akers, 119 N.H. 161, 400 A.2d 38 (1979); Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 173 N.J.
Super. 204, 413 A.2d 981 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799 (1981), an employer-
employee relationship, see Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 P. 924 (1904);
Commonwealth v. Sacks, 214 Mass. 72, 100 N.E. 1019 (1913), a co-felon relationship, see United
States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub norn. United States v. Feola, 420
U.S. 671 (1975); Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970),
and a relationship between an innocent and the one who causes his criminal conduct, see Fritz v.
State, 25 Wis. 2d 91, 96, 130 N.W.2d 279, 281 (1964), cerl. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965).
Modern codes often contain general provisions that permit vicarious liability. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.06(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
27. The rules governing the liability of officials within an organization are in some ways a spe-
cialized form of employer-employee vicarious liability and may impute both objective and mental
elements. They go beyond the rules of complicity to impute these elements of the offense upon the
showing of a supervisory relationship between the defendant and the perpetrator and culpably defi-
cient supervision. Typically, this doctrine imputes objective rather than mental elements, see United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United
States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), probably because liability is most
frequently imposed on organization officials where strict liability offenses are charged. See Park, 421
U.S. at 666 (1975); Dottenweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81 (1943). For a discussion of strict liability as a
form of imputation, see infra pp. 628-29.
Several modem codes contain general provisions setting forth the conditions for special liability of
organizational officials. The following statutes impute the act or omission required for an offense
upon a showing that a person who is primarily responsible for a duty imposed by law recklessly failed
to perform it. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(6)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); HAWAIi REv.
STAT. § 702-228(2) (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 61(2) (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 307(e)(2) (Purdon 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.030(4) (1977) (negligence suffices
in case of agent of top-level management); cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.4 (West 1979) (supervisor
liable for directing, knowingly permitting, or assigning duty which assignor can reasonably anticipate
will result in commission of offense); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-03-03(2) (1976) (omission need not be
culpable); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.24(A)(2) (Page 1982) (same).
28. For example, imputation may occur where "impossible attempts" are punished. Some see evil
in an attempt only if the actor comes close to doing actual harm. In the words of Holmes, there "must
be dangerous proximity to success." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J.,
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Most of the above rules can, at least theoretically, impute a required
element of any offense.29 Some may tend to apply to certain recurring
factual situations: Transferred intent appears most commonly in bad-aim
cases. But this is a factual rather than a theoretical limitation.
Given the variety of rules and doctrines of imputed liability, one may
reasonably question whether there is any similarity in their supporting
rationales. This Article identifies four theories that support imputed lia-
bility. Reflecting the tensions in criminal law generally, some of these jus-
tifications adhere closely to the requirement of personal culpability as a
prerequisite for criminal liability, while others rely on more utilitarian
concerns.
In many instances, an actor will be held accountable despite the absence
of a required element of culpability because he is causally responsible for'
the commission of an objective element by another or for the absence of a
required state of mind in himself or another. In the case of objective con-
duct elements, the actor may have caused or contributed to another's per-
formance of the required conduct. In the case of mental elements, the ac-
tor may have caused the absence of the required mental state in himself or
another by external means, such as intoxicants, or through simple "delib-
erate blindness" to the circumstances or consequences of his own conduct
or the conduct of another. This "causal theory" generally corresponds
well to our collective notions of culpability.
In some instances, however, while there may be a community consensus
dissenting); accord, People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 337, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (1927) (defendants not
liable for attempt because they did not come "very near to the accomplishment of the crime"). Under
this view, attempts should be punished only where the actor has progressed from mere preparation to
a certain proximity to actual, not imagined, commission.
Some jurisdictions, however, punish an attempt because the actor has demonstrated his dangerous-
ness or culpability. See G. FETrrcHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 174-75 (1978); G. WinatAs,
supra note 3, at 634. Similarly, where "present ability" to inflict harm is an element of assault or
assault with intent to kill, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970), that element must be imputed to
convict one who fires an unloaded shotgun at another of assault with intent to do bodily harm. See
State v. Mitchell, 139 Iowa 455, 459, 116 N.W. 808, 810 (1908) (acknowledging requirement of
present ability but concluding, without explanation, that if defendant believed gun was loaded, he was
guilty); cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1 (West 1979) (offense requires "apparent" rather than "present"
ability).
Imputation also occurs where defenses of mistake are limited so as to either bar a defense when an
actor's mistake of law negates an element of the offense or require a "reasonable" mistake where the
offense requires culpability greater than negligence. 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at § 62(c)(1)-(2);
see generally Robinson & Grail, supra note 10, at 725-32 (discussing relationship of defenses of
accident and mistake to culpability requirements).
29. Certain rules can normally be applied regardless of the offense: those governing complicity,
causing crime by an innocent, voluntary intoxication, and omissions, the doctrines of transferred in-
tent, of transferred actus reus, of substituted objective elements, and of substituted mental elements,
the suspension of the concurrence requirement, the Pinkerton doctrine, the natural and probable con-
sequence rule, vicarious liability, and the rules governing liability of officials within an organization.
While some presumptions apply to a variety of defenses, see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979) (presumption that persons intend natural and probable consequences of their acts), many pre-
sumptions apply only to a particular offense. See infra note 163.
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that an element should be imputed because the actor is as culpable as if he
had in fact satisfied the element, there is no analytic theory to support the
consensus. Rather, the best one can do is to restate the conclusion: The
actor is as culpable as one who satisfies the element. The doctrine of
transferred intent is illustrative. The label itself, cast in terms of transfer-
ring intention, is deceptively theoretical; the best explanation of why the
intent to shoot the desired victim should be "transferred" to the actual
victim is that both intentions are equally culpable. The theory is merely
one of equivalence. Section 2.04(2) of the Model Penal Code explicitly
reveals its reliance upon such an "equivalency theory": "Although igno-
rance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged
[i.e., would negative a required culpability element], the defense is not
available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situ-
ation been as he supposed."30 The rationale for imputing the absent state
of mind is simply that the actor had the intention (or other level of culpa-
bility) to commit another offense, and is therefore as culpable, and can
properly be treated, as if he had the required intention for the offense
committed.
Both the causal and the equivalency theory correspond to the "culpabil-
ity principle." Together with the satisfied elements of an offense, the re-
quirements of a rule of imputation supported by either theory closely ap-
proximate the paradigm of liability for the offense charged. That is,
because these two theories focus on culpability, the rules implementing the
theories include conditions that insure it.
A third theory eschews strict adherence to the culpability principle in
the face of practical problems of proof. Doctrines of imputation supported
by this theory thus do not always include conditions that insure culpabil-
ity. In these cases, a required element of the offense probably exists, but
the prosecution need not .prove that element since requiring such proof
would allow many culpable persons to escape conviction or would make
their convictions too costly to obtain. 1 Such an "evidentiary theory" for
imputing a required element balances the competing interests of fairness
and utility; as a result, the rules and doctrines supported by this theory
are the subject of considerable controversy.32
Finally, in still other instances of imputation, the culpability principle
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
31. The evidentiary theory is most often employed to support imputation of mental rather than
objective elements. One would expect such a pattern of application since the evidentiary rationale
responds to problems of proof, and proof of mental elements is more difficult than proof of objective
elements.
32. See infra p. 655 (constitutional challenges to presumptions); p. 622 (tension inherent in impo-
sition of criminal sanctions for strict liability offenses); p. 672 (constitutional limitations on status and
possession offenses); note 35 (broader debate over any evidentiary advantages for prosecution).
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may be sacrificed on utilitarian grounds to other important societal inter-
ests. Such a "nonculpability theory" for imputing required objective and
mental elements often supports rules and doctrines governing strict liabil-
ity, for example. The same societal interests that support strict liability
offenses are used to justify the rules and doctrines imputing required ele-
ments under a nonculpability theory.
These four theories-causal, equivalency, evidentiary, and
nonculpability-are not so much categories of imputed liability as they
are explanations or justifications for imputing an absent element of an
offense definition. It is possible, even likely, that more than one theory or
rationale may justify a particular rule, while only a combination of two or
more theories or rationales can adequately explain others."3 In every in-
stance, however, the justification provides a basis for a normative assess-
ment of such imputation.
Because a causal theory is likely to accord with the culpability principle
and to provide a clear analytic foundation for imputation, it may be the
preferred justification. Where a strong causal theory is available, no other
rationale is necessary. Despite its analytic shortcomings, an equivalency
theory is frequently as persuasive as a causal theory in justifying a partic-
ular rule or doctrine. Thus, where a causal argument fails, an equivalency
argument may be an acceptable fallback.34 Unfortunately, equivalency
fails to provide a general principle for discovering and supporting other
instances of imputation. Every claim of equivalency must be justified by
an independent demonstration of consensus.
To accept an evidentiary rationale, one must be willing to trade the
potential for some erroneous convictions for increased ease of prosecution.
The latter interest goes beyond mere concern for the convenience of prose-
33. For an illustration of a dual justification, see infra p. 644 (analyzing felony murder as sup-
ported by causal and equivalency theories). For a discussion of the implications of alternative theories
supporting a single instance of imputation, see infra pp. 660-75.
34. In Moore v. State, 267 Ind. 270, 369 N.E. 2d 628 (1977), for example, the court rejected
defendant's contention that he was not guilty of burglary since he did not "break" into the victim's
residence: Because the victim unlocked the door at gun point, defendant "was as guilty of breaking as
if he had taken the keys from her hand and unlocked the door himself." Id. at 277-78, 369 N.E.2d at
632 (emphasis added). The causal argument for this type of causing crime by an innocent is so com-
pelling that the court need not have relied on a vague equivalency rationale: The actor is as culpable
as if he had engaged in the prohibited conduct himself, because he caused the element to be satisfied
by another. See infra pp. 631-32.
Because a causal theory leads to analysis of specific elements required by liability-i.e., culpability
as to causing, the causal relationship, and culpability as to the substantive offense-it encourages the
precise definition of the conditions that must be satisfied prior to imputation. The equivalency theory,
however, merely asserts an equivalence and thus encourages imprecise definitions and may permit
arbitrary results. Equivalency theories, in this sense, are akin to the early "wickedness" notion of
mens rea typical of "offense analysis"; like "offense analysis," equivalency theories should be replaced
whenever possible with a theory more compatible with the modern "element analysis" approach to
culpability. For a discussion of the virtues of element analysis, see generally Robinson & GraIl, supra
note 10, at 703-04.
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cutors. It permits conviction of dangerous criminals who might have es-
caped conviction but for the evidentiary advantage of such imputation.
Rules relying upon evidentiary rationales are thus subject to the criticisms
presented in the broader debate over evidentiary advantages for the prose-
cution generally.35 Since evidentiary concerns are independent of culpabil-
ity concerns, evidentiary rationales comprise a specialized subgroup of
nonculpability rationales. 6 However, rather than rejecting the validity of
the culpability principle, they approximate it as closely as the problems of
proof permit.
Nonculpability rationales are most susceptible to criticism and should
be the least favored theory supporting imputation.3 7 They must justify not
simply the creation of an evidentiary shortcut to proving the presence of
the required offense elements, as in evidentiary rationales; they must also
justify the rejection of the culpability principle. Nonculpability rationales
therefore implicate the broader debate over whether criminal law should
serve a purely utilitarian purpose or should punish only after an assess-
ment of personal culpability."
35. One writer states the argument in the context of presumptions:
The urge for simplifying the task of the prosecutor in certain cases by requiring the defendant
to go forward with evidence on some of the issuable facts is balanced by the very real fear that
going too far in this direction may result in substituting an inquisitorial procedure for our
traditional accusatorial system.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 811 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Learned
Hand, in support of limited defense discovery, suggested that the balance has tipped too far in favor of
the defendant: "Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted.
It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1923).
The tension also arises in a variety of other evidentiary and procedural contexts. See Arenella,
Reforming the Federal Grand jury and the State Preliminary Hearing To Prevent Conviction With-
out Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1980); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
36. Every use of an evidentiary rationale arguably must rely in part on nonculpability rationales
because as long as the required element need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt there will be
some cases where it is not in fact present. The frequency of such erroneous imputations, however, is
significantly reduced where an imputed element may be rebutted.
37. For example, Lords Edmund-Davies and Salmon in Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Majew-
ski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142, need not have conceded that limiting a voluntary intoxication defense was
"illogical," see supra note 3, or have resorted to defending their position with a nonculpability deter-
rent rationale, see infra p. 661. Critics of the decision, see Dashwood, Logic and the Lords in Majew-
ski (pts. 1 & 2), 1977 GRIM. L. REV. 532, 591, would have had more difficulty disparaging a causal
theory analysis in Majewski. For a discussion of a doctrine of voluntary intoxication based on a causal
theory, see infra pp. 639-42, 662.
38. The commentary to § 2.05 of the Model Penal Code summarizes the debate in the context of
strict liability:
It has been argued, and the argument undoubtedly will be repeated, that absolute liability is
necessary for enforcement in a number of the areas where it obtains. But if practical enforce-
ment can not undertake to litigate the culpability of alleged deviation from legal requirements,
we do not see how the enforcers rightly can demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose.
Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment
unless it can declare that the defendant's act was wrong. This is too fundamental to be com-
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II. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The preceding explication of the theories supporting imputation has
several practical purposes. As a general matter, the development of a ra-
tional and consistent theoretical framework is the first step toward a ra-
tional and consistent criminal law. There is nothing more practical than a
good theory. In addition, the theories of imputation provide significant
insights into specific doctrinal problems. First, their common characteris-
tics suggest that the same process of imputing liability exists in more sub-
tle form in the definition of certain offenses. Recognition of such codified
imputation provides, in turn, a basis for analyzing these offenses. It may
explain the use of an otherwise unjustifiable form of liability, or it may
expose the impropriety of a form of liability and suggest limitations de-
rived from the principles of imputation.
Moreover, the conceptual framework of imputed liability described in
Part I can help identify similarities among criminal law doctrines. Under
the proper circumstances, sufficiently analogous doctrines should have
analogous requirements and analogous results. The framework thus pro-
vides a device for comparative analysis of instances of imputed liability.
Finally, the conceptual framework encourages one to evaluate a doc-
trine's practical consistency with its underlying theory or rationale. Where
the conceptual framework suggests that alternative theories support a doc-
trine, one might argue that the formulation of the doctrine, or the rules
governing its application, should vary with the theory relied upon. Again,
these analyses may serve either to justify apparent aberrations in the for-
mulation of a doctrine or to criticize a formulation that is not true to its
underlying theory.
A. Recognition of Certain Offenses as Codified Forms of Imputation
There are at least four instances of substantive if not formal deviation
from the paradigm of offense liability: the aggravation of culpability in
felony murder, status offenses, possession offenses, and strict liability of-
fenses. In each case,.liability is imposed only when all the elements of the
formal definition of the offense charged are satisfied. Under a literal read-
ing, there has been no imputed liability since the defendant has satisfied
all the express elements of the offense. There is reason to believe, how-
ever, that the statutory definition itself embraces principles of imputation
rather than a complete statement of the paradigm. Thus, even though a
promised. The law goes far enough if it permits the imposition of a monetary penalty in cases
where strict liability has been imposed.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 comment 1, at 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). For additional authorities
on the debate over strict liability, see infra note 63.
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defendant has met all the formal requirements for the offense, that offense
may well be only a codified application of imputed liability.
Murder generally requires either an intentional or knowing killing or
recklessness "manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life."' 9 But if an accidental killing occurs in the course of armed robbery,
the felony-murder rule can aggravate the actor's culpability and allow
conviction for murder.40 Such a killing satisfies the formal definition of
the offense of "felony murder," which requires a death during an under-
lying felony,41 and in that sense is not a deviation from the paradigm as
expressed in the definition of the offense. But one can view the formal
definition of felony murder as the codification of a principle that imputes
the culpable state of mind required for murder whenever the actor causes
a death in the course of a felony.42
Various restrictions on the application of the felony-murder rule sup-
port the view that it imputes the culpable mental state for murder. These
restrictions increase the likelihood that persons held liable under the rule
will in fact possess that culpable state of mind. Examples of such restric-
tions include statutes that limit the rule to certain dangerous felonies4" as
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(b) (1980). The "extreme indifference" requirement is some-
times described as manifesting "an abandoned and malignant heart." See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
188 (West 1970) (when circumstances attending killing show "an abandoned and malignant heart"
requisite malice aforethought for murder conviction is implied); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *199 (distinguishing murder from other homicides on basis of malice,
which Blackstone defines as "the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart").
40. This aspect of the felony-murder rule is conceptually and historically distinct from the com-
plicity aspect discussed supra note 25. In this Article, the former is denoted by the term "the aggrava-
tion of culpability" aspect of the felony-murder rule.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982) (every murder committed during robbery or attempted rob-
bery is first-degree murder).
42. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 28 Cal. App. 3d 653, 658, 104 Cal. Rptr. 807, 811 (1972)
(malice aforethought is conclusively presumed from commission or attempted commission of robbery
and killing during perpetration of robbery); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980)
(because intent to commit felony does not in itself establish a man-endangering state of mind, common
law felony-murder doctrine is abrogated). It might be argued that the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized that the paradigm for murder requires culpability as to homicide. Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (imposition of death penalty unconstitutional where homicide committed by codefend-
ant, and defendant not culpable as to homicide).
Because the intent to commit a felony is not necessarily the same as the intent to murder, the
fictitious nature of a substitution of the former for the latter is apparent. See generally FOURTH
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF CRIMINAL LAW xxviii (1839) (condemning felony murder as
form of constructive murder); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980) (discussed
supra). There is continuing debate over whether malice is imputed to an actor who kills during a
felony or is simply inferable from his felonious intent. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE MICHIGAN
STATE BAR FOR THE REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE: FINAL DRAFT-JUNE 1979 § 2002 com-
mittee commentary at 202 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MICH. 2D PROPOSED REv.] (describing split in
Michigan courts over this issue).
43. The enumeration of felonies that support application of the felony-murder rule is the most
common statutory approach to felony murder. These enumerated felonies generally include crimes
involving danger to human life. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975) (limiting appli-
cation of rule to commission of or attempt to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, or rape);
accord ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (1983); N.J.
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well as judicial decisions and statutory provisions that limit liability to
homicides that are reasonably foreseeable results of the felony"' and are
caused "in furtherance of" the underlying felony.4'
The Model Penal Code's treatment of felony murder is instructive. Af-
ter conceding that "principled argument in . . . defense [of felony mur-
der] is hard to find,"' the drafters nonetheless have retained an amelio-
rated form of that doctrine which facilitates classifying as murder an
accidental killing during a felony. This "reasonable substitute for the
felony-murder rule"47 provides that a death caused during the commission
of certain specified felonies creates a rebuttable presumption that the de-
fendant caused the death recklessly under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life, as required for murder."8
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(a)(3) (West 1982); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1983) (also
including drug trafficking, sexual battery, escape, aircraft piracy, bomb throwing). See generally Ad-
lerstein, Felony-Murder in the New Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249, 269-74 (1975-76) (detailing
statutory practice of enumerating various felonies); Note, The Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a
Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133, 138-41 & nn.14-30 (1978) (discussing various statutory for-
mulations). Several jurisdictions adopting the enumerated felony approach further limit felony murder
by allowing a defendant who did not commit or aid in the homicidal act to avoid liability for the
homicidal acts of his co-felons. See infra p. 667. Other states explicitly require that the felony be
committed in a dangerous manner. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1502(a) (1977); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
Similarly, the judiciary has limited the felony-murder rule to dangerous felonies. See State v. Un-
derwood, 228 Kan. 294, 615 P.2d 153 (1980) (construing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981) to
require inherently dangerous felony and holding that possession of firearm by convicted felon is not
such felony); Regina v. Sern, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (Central Crim. Ct. 1887) (discussed infra
note 125).
44. See State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 719-20, 722, 50 S.W.2d 1049, 1053, 1054 (1932) (death
must be "a natural and proximate result" of felony, and defendant must have had reason to believe
injury would occur).
Because the issue of proximate causation can be viewed as turning on the foreseeability of the
result, requiring this causal relationship between the felonious conduct and the death imposes a limi-
tation similar to the reasonably foreseeable result requirement. See Regina v. Horsey, 3 F.&F. 287,
176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862) (if victim entered barn after defendant set fire that spread to barn, victim's
act was intervening cause that broke causal chain between felony and homicide). Cf. S. 1437, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1601(a)(3), (c)(1)-(2) (1977) (any homicide committed during one of enumerated
felonies is murder; affirmative defense exists where death was neither necessary nor reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of underlying offense). Other foreseeability formulations limit liability only for
deaths caused by co-felons. See infra p. 667.
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 418 A.2d 312 (1980) (felony-murder rule
applicable only to homicides committed "in furtherance of" underlying offense); Buel v. People, 78
N.Y. 492, 497 (1879) (requiring that "death ensued in the consequence of the felony"). Several juris-
dictions have codified a similar limitation: The homicidal act must be committed "in the course of and
in furtherance of such crime." ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (a)(3) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3)
(1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501(1)(a), -1502(1)(a) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b)
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54c (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2), (6), (7) (1979
& Supp. 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3)
(Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1981); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(3)
(Vernon 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (1977).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment at 37 (1980).
47. Id. comment at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
48. Id. comments at 29, 39 (1980). The Model Penal Code defines murder as, inter alia, causing
another's death "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life." The Code then creates a rebuttable presumption of such recklessness and indifference
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Such a revision invites characterization of the traditional felony-murder
rule as an irrebuttable presumption of the culpability required for
murder.
Thus, felony murder may not represent an independent harm or evil.
Rather, the crime may be a derivative formulation of the traditional mur-
der offense that codifies a rule that imputes traditional culpability for
murder when the killing occurs during a felony.49 Under this view, felony
murder does not reject the paradigm of murder; it builds upon it.5°
Perhaps possession cases present the clearest case of codified imputed
liability. Again, to be held liable for possession, one must satisfy all the
elements of the definition of the offense. But, as with felony murder, the
definition of the offense does not truly represent the paradigm-it does
not fully and accurately describe the harm or evil the offense seeks to
punish. Possession offenses seek to prohibit and punish not possession it-
self, but harmful conduct, past or future, that is facilitated and evidenced
by the possession. The possession of trace amounts of narcotics, for exam-
ple, suggests their past use or distribution.51
In addition to punishing possession of narcotics, many jurisdictions
where a death results from the commission or attempted commission of certain enumerated felonies.
See id. § 210.2(1)(a)-(b) (1980) (murder); id. § 1.12(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (effect of
presumptions). Thus, where the accused has not in fact acted with the requisite recklessness and
indifference but cannot overcome the presumption created by his participation in an enumerated fel-
ony, he may be convicted although he does not satisfy all the elements of the offense. Arguably, section
210.2(1)(b) violates the demands of due process. For a discussion of constitutional limitations on pre-
sumptions, see infra p. 655. Ironically, statutory and judicial formulations of the felony-murder rule
that dispense with proof of culpability by defining the offense to require only a death caused in the
commission of any or certain felonies seem to avoid this constitutional problem.
49. It is much like the definition of arson quoted earlier that includes complicity liability within
the definition of the offense. See supra note 6.
50. In at least one case, because of procedural peculiarities, courts have confirmed this view of
felony murder. In State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 P: 58 (1911), for example, the information
charged a premeditated killing, not felony murder. Responding to the defendant's claim that the proof
of felony murder at trial did not correspond to the information, the Utah Supreme Court concluded:
"[Tihe 'willful and premeditated intent to commit the felony is transferred from that offense to the
homicide actually committed,' and 'is the legal equivalent of and tantamount to' the allegations in the
information of a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing by shooting." Id. at 217, 117 P. 58, 61
(court does not identify the source of the internal quotation; at time of Thorne, culpability required
for first-degree murder was malice aforethought and premeditation). The language of the opinion also
illustrates the similarity between the felony-murder rule and the other intent "transferring" doctrines
of imputation discussed previously.
51. As one court explained:
The legislative policy [behind criminalizing possession of trace amounts of narcotics] is obvi-
ously to stop the horrendous traffic in narcotics which has led to the unfortunate addiction of
so many people, and the unfortunate waste of human life. Thus, the Legislature in its attempt
to guard the public health and safety has proscribed the use, possession and sale of the illegal
substance.
People v. Harrington, 396 Mich. 33, 47, 238 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1976). See generally Note, Criminal
Liability for Possession of Non-Usable Amounts of Controlled Substances, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 596,
616-17 (1977) (prohibition of possession of trace amounts of narcotics reflects strong inference of past
possession of usable amounts of narcotics).
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punish possession of burglar's tools, 52 counterfeiting dyes,53 dangerous
weapons, 54 motor vehicle master keys, 5 or drug paraphernalia.5 ' In each
instance, one can readily identify the actual harm or evil that is of con-
cern, and it is this harm and the accompanying elements of culpability
that more appropriately comprise the paradigm of the offense. In relation
to this true paradigm, there is indeed a deviation. The objective and cul-
pability requirements of the paradigm are imputed upon proof of
possession.
5 7
Status offenses are analogous to possession offenses; the definition does
not represent the true paradigm of the offense. Thus, vagrancy statutes,
common before they were subject to constitutional challenge, 58 punish the
conduct and culpability of attempted theft.59 They frequently have been
replaced by "loitering or prowling" offenses,60 which are designed to pro-
52. E.g., M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 403 (1983).
53. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 474 (1982).
54. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); People v. Stinson, 8 Cal.
App. 3d. 497, 87 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1970) (conviction for possession of sawed-off shotgun).
55. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-6 (West 1982).
56. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,364 (West Supp. 1983) (possession of para-
phernalia used for unlawfully injecting or smoking controlled substance); accord N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
24:21-47 to -48 (West Supp. 1983). Often these statutes are patterned after the Model Drug Para-
phernalia Act of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
57. In Peachie v. State, 203 Md. 239, 100 A.2d 1 (1953), however, because narcotics possession
rather than narcotics use was criminalized, the court was obliged to argue in reverse-from actual use
to possession-to establish the objective element of possession and control required by the formal
definition of the offense:
The evidence . . . would permit the inference that [the defendant] had taken an injection of
the drug just prior to the entry of the officers. This circumstantial evidence points clearly to
the fact that he had administered the drug to himself. Of course, if that fact is assumed, it
necessarily follows that he had possession and control of the instrument and its contents at the
time of the injection ....
Id. at 242-43, 100 A.2d at 2. Of course, where the punishment for possession is significantly less than
the punishment prescribed for the completion of the actual harm that the legislation is designed to
prevent, one may use possession as a basis for imputing the objective and mental elements of an
attempt to commit the offense.
58. Vagrancy was at one time an offense in every American jurisdiction. Foote, Vagrancy-Tpe
Lau- and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 609 & n.7 (1956). See generally Note, The
Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 102,
108-14 (1962) (discussing vagrancy statutes from forty-eight jurisdictions).
59. For example, in 1547, the preamble to the "Slavery Act," a vagrancy statute, noted:
"fI]dleness and vagabondry is the mother and root of all thefts, robberies, and all evil acts, and other
mischiefs . . . ." An Act for the Punishment of Vagabonds, 1547, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3.; see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 250.12 comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of
Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203 (1953); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and
Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (1960).
60. The drafters of the Model Penal Code, for example, rejected the concept of status criminality
and proposed instead a "suspicious loitering" offense that punishes one whose conduct justifies suspi-
cion that he is about to engage in criminal activity. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No.
13, 1961). Section 250.12 was subsequently modified to require justifiable "alarm" for the safety of
persons or property. Id. § 250.6 (1980).
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hibit and punish a variety of preparatory criminal conduct. Elements of
the attempt are imputed upon proof of loitering or prowling."1
Strict liability offenses are a fourth instance of codifed imputed liability,
although the characterization is more tenuous here. While the definition
of a strict liability offense does not formally contain a culpable state-of-
mind element,"2 arguably the true harm or evil the statute is meant to
prohibit includes such an element, and the paradigm therefore includes
culpability. A vast literature supports the normative claim that culpability
should be required in all offenses."3 Strong evidence also suggests that, as
a descriptive matter, culpability remains part of the general paradigm for
all criminal offenses. Every modern criminal code includes general provi-
sions either requiring culpability" or at least creating a presumption that
the legislature intended to require culpability, as to each element of every
offense that carries the stigma of the criminal sanction. 5
One may at least argue, then, that offenses without a requirement of
culpability deviate from the true paradigm, and that the culpability re-
61. To be convicted for "loitering or prowling," id. § 250.6 (1980), the actor need not "purposely
[do or fail] to do anything . . . constituting a substantial step" toward the commission of the offense
and need not have "the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime." Id. §
5.01(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (definition of attempt). The elements of attempt are im-
puted upon proof of the circumstances of loitering or prowling "in a place, at a time, or in a manner
not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons
or property in the vicinity." Id. § 250.6 (1980). Narcotics vagrancy offenses have been defended on
the basis of such imputation-that such offenses are useful in preventing and punishing past, planned
or attempted drug transactions. See Ricks v. United States, 228 A.2d 316 (D.C. 1967), rev'd, 414
F.2d 1097 (D.C. Cir.) and 414 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
62. Strict liability is commonly imposed by failing to include a culpability requirement in the
definition of a particular offense. Statutes that impose strict liability are common where actors gener-
ally can avoid the sanction through the exercise of due care, e.g., in the manufacuture, distribution, or
sale of drugs, food, liquor, and explosives. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 comment 2, at 141-45
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 84-88 (1933);
Annot., 152 A.L.R. 755 (1944) (discussing strict liability for violations of food laws).
63. E.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70-71 (2d ed. 1960); G. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 3, at 75-99; Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1952); Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932); Sayre, supra note 62. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.05 comments I & 2, at 140-46 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (summarizing arguments and catalogu-
ing literature).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(3), 2.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See generally Robin-
son & Grall, Element Analysis, sapra note 10, at 700 n.84 (listing jurisdictions adopting provisions
that require at least recklessness whenever culpability requirement is not specified in definition of
crime). The commentary to § 2.02(3) states that by imposing liability for recklessness unless otherwise
specified, the drafters establish "as the basic norm what usually is regarded as the common law
position." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 4, at 127 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970) (every crime must have union of act and intent, or criminal negli-
gence); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.190 (1981) (same).
65. The presumption is strong where the penalty is severe. Some of these statutes direct the court
to require at least recklessness if the presumption is not defeated by a contrary indication of legislative
intent. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b)-(c) (Vernon 1974). Others permit the court to apply
any of the defined culpability requirements. See Criminal Code of 1961 §§ 4-3 to -9, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 4-3 to -9 (Smith-Hurd 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34(1), (5) (1983); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 15.05, 15.15(2) (McKinney 1975).
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quired by the paradigm is in fact imputed.66 For example, where a state
law prohibits the sale of liquor to minors, one might argue that all tavern
owners are under a legal duty to ascertain the age of their customers, and
that they should recognize this duty. If an owner nevertheless sells alcohol
to a minor, he can be considered culpable, as negligent per se.6" Of course,
the statute will impute negligence whether or not the circumstances war-
rant such a finding,68 but the failure to include a culpability element in
the formal definition does not refute a claim that the harm or evil sought
to be prevented and punished-the paradigm-includes a culpability re-
quirement. Rather, one can consider the culpability element imputed
when the actor satisfies the formal elements of the offense.
The claim here-that all four of these classes of offenses are designed to
punish a harm or evil other than that manifested in their formal defini-
tions and that the elements of the true paradigms are imputed upon proof
of the conditions stated in the offenses' formal definitions-is not unassail-
able. One might argue that these definitions accurately represent a para-
digm that simply rejects the principles of culpability that govern other,
traditional formulations of offenses. The difficulty of supporting this argu-
ment varies with each instance. It is extremely difficult to argue that pos-
session alone is really the harm or evil prohibited and punished by posses-
sion offenses. It is at least plausible, however, that felony murder
represents an independent harm or evil in which the culpability for mur-
der really is irrelevant. Similarly, pure status offenses and strict liability
offenses may define a punishable harm or evil. This characterization is
possible, however, only if one is willing to reject the notions of act and
culpability as universal requirements for criminal liability. 9 Many would
be unwilling to do so.
66. The existence of general code provisions that establish culpability as a norm, see supra notes
64-65, supports the view of strict liability as an exception to the paradigm. See also G. FLErCHER,
supra note 28, at 717-22; W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 15, § 31, at 221; Abrams, Criminal
Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28
UCLA L. REv. 463, 465-66, 473 (1981); Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Compara-
tfie Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 405 (1971); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal
Lau-, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731, 743-44 (1960).
67. State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 57 N.W.2d 553 (1953). For a discussion of strict liability as
supported by an evidentiary rationale, i.e., one that relies on the likely existence of culpability, see
infra p. 654.
68. See State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 245 P. 375 (1926) (defendant convicted of polygamy
despite evidence of actual good faith). For a discussion of the only rationale for imputation of culpa-
bility where it is clearly absent, see infra pp. 669-70; cf. People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d
850 (1956) (different result reached on basis of evidentiary rationale; case discussed infra note 168).
69. Indeed, if one is willing to disregard the requirements of an act and culpability, one may be
able to claim that many instances of clearformnal deviation, such as complicity, are in fact instances of
substantive compliance in which no imputation occurs. But this approach does not advance the in-
quiry. If, however, these offenses are accepted as instances of substantive deviations from the para-
digm, then a comparison of these offenses to other instances of imputed liability may provide insight
into the proper formulation of these offenses.
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B. Analogous Requirements and Results for Analogous Doctrines of
Imputation
Under a rational and principled criminal law, analogous rules should
have analogous requirements and analogous results. Rules may be analo-
gous because they seek similar goals, rely on similar rationales, or overlap
in application. Thus, where doctrines impute similar elements on the basis
of a common justifying theory-causal, equivalency, evidentiary, or
nonculpability-there is a basis on which to argue for analogous require-
ments and results. This is especially true if the doctrines cover the same or
similar factual situations."' Dissimilar requirements and results in such
cases create the specter of arbitrariness by making liability dependent not
upon the actor's culpability but rather upon the rule chosen to impute it.
This section employs the conceptual framework of imputation to identify
analogous doctrines and to criticize the anomalous results from failures to
recognize such analogies.
One could argue that all doctrines sharing a particular theory of impu-
tation-causal, equivalency, evidentiary, or nonculpability-are analogous
doctrines. But it is possible to define more precisely the underlying theo-
ries of imputation and thereby increase the similarity among doctrines
sharing a particular theory. Some causal theories of imputation rely on
the fact that the defendant has caused his own or another's criminal con-
duct. Other causal theories, in contrast, claim that imputation is appropri-
ate because the actor has created a dangerous situation in which the harm
or evil was likely to occur. Similarly, two different kinds of equivalency
theories support imputation: substituted culpability and cumulative culpa-
bility. The two most common forms of evidentiary arguments are, first,
that circumstances suggest that culpability required by the offense defini-
tion probably exists and need not be proved, and, second, that the ele-
ments of complicity probably exist and need not be proved. Most
nonculpability theories are similar in form, imputing required elements to
increase the deterrent threat of the criminal sanction. Comparison of doc-
trines sharing a specific theory reveals their many similarities. Differences
In any case, the identity and legitimacy of the conceptual group of instances of imputed liability do
not depend on acceptance of these offenses as instances of imputation.
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979) (defendant's hostage acciden-
tally killed by officer; case could be analyzed as causing crime by innocent or felony murder); State v.
Akers, 119 N.H. 161, 400 A.2d 38 (1979) (recognizing similarity of factual situations giving rise to
vicarious liability of parents and "status" offenses, and invalidating, on ground that it punishes status,
statute imposing vicarious parental liability); Queen v. Saunders & Archer, 2 P1. Com. 473, 75 Eng.
Rep. 706 (1575) (husband who poisoned apple and gave it to wife held liable for death of child, who
was given apple by wife; opinion suggests that case can be analyzed as one of causing crime by
innocent or transferred intent). For a discussion of overlap between the doctrines of vicarious liability,
conspiracy, complicity, the complicity aspect of felony murder, and causing crime by an innocent, see
supra note 26. For a discussion of overlap between omission liability and complicity, see infra p. 673.
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also appear, however, which illuminate both the proper formulation of the
particular doctrine and the nature of the conceptual group.
1. Causing Another To Engage in Criminal Conduct
An actor who does not personally satisfy an objective element, such as
conduct, but who directly causes the required element by other means
should be treated as if he satisfied the element himself. 1 Indeed, in cases
where the causal link is strong, it is natural to think that the actor actu-
ally did satisfy the element himself. Where the actor uses a crowbar to
break into a house, he is taken to satisfy the objective element of "break-
ing" even though he did not use his own hands. If he causes his pet gorilla
to break the door, the result is the same. When he causes an insane person
to do the breaking, where the insane person's capacity for self-
determination and the defendant's control over the insane person are com-
parable to the capacity of and his control over the gorilla, the result again
remains the same. In this last instance, however, the analysis may shift
away from causation by the actor to "causing crime by an innocent." 72
This similarity between humans and non-human objects in completing
the causal chain often leads to ambiguity in the demarcation between pure
causation and causing crime by an innocent. In Morse v. United States,"3
71. See, e.g., Morse v. United States, 174 F. 539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909)
(discussed infra p. 632); Moore v. State, 267 Ind. 270, 369 N.E.2d 628 (1977) (discussed supra note
34); Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947) (where causal element is strong,
actor is responsible for result as if he caused it himself).
72. Several states have adopted separate "causing crime by an innocent" provisions similar to
Model Penal Code § 2.06(2)(a), quoted supra note 11. ALA. CODE § 13-A-2-22 (1982); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-303(A)(2) (Supp. 1982-83) (liability for causing another person to commit crime
"whether or not [he] is capable of forming culpable mental state"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-302(3)
(1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-601 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(1) (1979); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-801(b)(2) (1983) (liability for intentionally causing crime by another who is not guilty
either "in fact or because of legal incapacity"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-221(2)(a) (1976); Crimi-
nal Code of 1961 § 5-2(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. §
502.010(l)(b) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(2)(A) (1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
2-302(1) (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(II)(a) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6(b)(1)
(West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1)(a) (1976) (imposing liability for causing another to
engage in criminal conduct; does not specify that other party may be innocent or irresponsible); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(4) (Page 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(b)(1) (Purdon 1973);
Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 702(a)(1) (Vernon 1974); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020 (1977).
The remainder of the states and the District of Columbia impose liability in this situation under
their normal complicity rules. Typical of this approach is CAL PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1970);
People v. Roberts, 26 Cal. App. 3d 385, 103 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1972) (no defense to aiding and abetting
that defendant induced children who were legally incapable of committing crime); accord People v.
Alexander, 17 Mich. App. 30, 169 N.W.2d 190 (1969) (asportation element of theft may be accom-
plished by confederate or innocent agent); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982) (punishing one who
willfully causes another's act that would be offense if performed directly by causing agent); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-67.2(A) (1982) (incorporating liability for causing crime by innocent in sexual penetration
offense). For a discussion of the common law treatment of one who causes crime by an innocent, see
W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, supra note 15, § 63, at 496-97.
73. 174 F. 539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909).
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for example, the court held that it was immaterial whether Morse, vice-
president of the National Bank of North America, himself recorded stock
purchases as loans or whether he caused employees so to record the trans-
actions in the ordinary course of business. 4 The court simply reasoned
that it was "immaterial whether such officer acts through a pen or a clerk
controlled by him."'7 5 The revisors of section 2(b), title 18 of the United
States Code similarly decline to distinguish human from non-human
causal links. Their revision notes state: "[Olne who puts in motion or
assists in the illegal enterprise but causes the commission of an indispen-
sable element of the offense by an innocent agent or instrumentality, is
guilty . .. ",
An actor's causal connection with the required objective elements of the
offense will usually be more attenuated than in Morse. There is clearly a
spectrum of cases along which the strength of the causal relation varies
with the actor's degree of control over the other person or, in other words,
with the other person's degree of independent action. In Fritz v. State"
the defendant persuaded one Clayton, who had a history of mental illness,
to kill the defendant's husband. The defendant's persuasive powers de-
rived from her emotional manipulation of Clayton. Clayton was later ad-
judged insane and found not guilty of the killing on that basis, while the
defendant was held liable for first-degree murder. 78 The defendant's con-
trol in Fritz was somewhat less than in Morse, as Clayton's opportunity
or potential for independent action was greater.
This spectrum from pure causation analysis through causing crime by
an innocent via an innocent dupe to causing crime by an innocent via
clever persuasion, continues into cases likely to be analyzed as instances of
complicity. 9 But even within this latter group there exist variations in the
74. Id. at 547.
75. ld.; accord United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 49 (1937) (citing Morse); People v. Jack, 233
Cal. App. 2d 446, 456, 43 Cal. Rptr. 566, 572 (1965) ("a person [who] has caused a crime to be
committed through the instrumentality of an innocent agent" is guilty of that crime). The instrumen-
tality analysis has also been employed to defend liability under the Pinkerton doctrine. See State v.
Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 339-40, 91 A.2d 571, 575-76 (1952) (conspiratorial relationship analogous to
principal/agent; what is done by agent is done by principal; agent is principal's "mere instrument").
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), historical and revision notes (1982) (emphasis added). Even more indicative
of the revisors' reliance on pure causal analysis is the fact that the 1948 revision failed to include a
culpability requirement for causing crime by an innocent. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment
at 16 n.11 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953). The culpability requirement "willfully" was subsequently
added. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982). For a discussion of the culpability requirements for causing crime
by an innocent, see infra pp. 637-38.
77. 25 Wis. 2d 91, 130 N.W.2d 279 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965).
78. Id. at 94, 130 N.W.2d at 280.
79. Sayre, for example, attempts to explain a variety of criminal law doctrines, including complic-
ity and vicarious liability, using a causal responsibility theory: "It is not surprising . . . that courts
today as a general rule. . . make criminal liability exclusively dependent upon causation. Causation
may be proved either (1) by authorization, procurement, incitation or moral encouragement, or (2) by
knowledge plus acquiescence . . . ." Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43
Vol. 93: 609, 1984
Imputed Criminal Liability
actor's involvement with his accomplice. Such involvement ranges from
cases where the actor serves as the mastermind and moving force in the
operation,80 through cases where he is essentially an equal in his contri-
bution to the success of the venture,"' through cases where his contribu-
tion constitutes minor facilitation, 2 to cases where only encouragement
and no actual aid is given.83
Even one who makes no direct contribution to the conduct constituting
the offense may be held criminally liable if he is nonetheless causally con-
nected to the act, at least in the sense that he has created or helped create
the situation in which the offense occurs. Such causal responsibility, based
upon creation of or contribution to the situation in which another commits
an offense, has justified the imputation of a required objective element
HARv. L. REV. 689, 702-03, 706-07 (1930).
80. For example, in Asher v. United States, 394 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1968), the defendant per-
suaded his accomplice to rob a bank, planned the execution of the robbery, provided the money used
to purchase the toy gun and sack, provided a post-robbery hiding place by locating and unlocking a
parked car, and promised to pick up his accomplice after the robbery. Id. at 428.
81. For example, in Ivey v. State, 232 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1970), all three co-felons participated in
a robbery, but the defendant, unlike other participants, was unarmed. He nonetheless was held liable
for armed robbery. The court reasoned "[alll three acted jointly and in concert; each was responsible
and accountable for the wrongful actions of the other two." Id. at 369.
82. Complicity liability on the basis of trivial assistance is illustrated by the case of State v.
Duran, 86 N.M. 594, 526 P.2d 188 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187 (1974). See
supra p. 613. In some cases no assistance is required. See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Tally, 102
Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1893). On the degree of assistance normally required, see generally W. LAFAvE
& A. ScoTT, supra note 15, § 63, at 502-05.
83. In Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464, for example, the court went so far as to conclude
that the defendant's attendance at a concert given by a foreign performer in violation of the per-
former's visiting permit, was a sufficient basis for finding the defendant an accomplice to the violation.
For a discussion of encouragement as a basis for accomplice liability, see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
659 (2d ed. 1969).
In large measure, the common law distinctions between participants in a felony were abandoned
soon after their procedural and practical significance disappeared; at common law accessories before
or after the fact could not be convicted if the principal in the first degree escaped, died, or was
acquitted or pardoned; however, principals in the second degree could be convicted under these cir-
cumstances, W. LAFAVE & A. ScowT, supra note 15, § 63, at 500. Modern codes eliminate the
accessory/principal distinctions, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962),
reflecting differences in degrees of causal contribution to the offense. A principal in the first degree
was the one who personally committed the criminal act, or who caused an innocent to commit a crime.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, § 63, at 496-97. A principal in the second degree was one
present at the scene who aided, counselled, commanded, or encouraged the act but did not himself
perform it. Id. § 63, at 497. An accessory before the fact was one not present at the scene, but who
aided, counselled, commanded, or encouraged the act. Id. § 63, at 498.
An accessory after the fact was one who aided the principal after completion of the offense. Id. §
66, at 522. At early common law, the accessory after the fact could be held guilty of the substantive
offense committed by the principal, but now he is viewed as an obstructor of justice and held liable for
that offense rather than for contributing to the substantive offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§
242.3-.4 (1980); R. PERKINS, supra, at 682-84.
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under the complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule, 4 the Pinkerton
doctrine,"5 and the natural and probable consequence rule in complicity."
A similar theory of causal responsibility has supported the rules gov-
erning vicarious liability and the liability of officials within an organiza-
tion. Sayre, for example, argues that the primary and appropriate basis
for the imposition of vicarious liability (in which he means to include
complicity as well as the more narrow strict-liability meaning of "vicari-
ous liability" that is intended in this Article) should be "strict principles
of causation."'8 7 A causal theory has also justified the rules governing the
liability of officials within an organization, although the decision in
United States v. Park"8 suggests that another rationale is now also at
work. As some writers have observed, after Park courts no longer require
as a prerequisite for liability a close relationship between a corporate of-
ficer's activities and the criminal violation or a showing that the defendant
in some way had "caused" the prohibited result.8 9
Despite the variety of the rules and doctrines employed to impose liabil-
ity, in each instance considered above the defendant causally contributes to
84. See Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 643-44, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974) ("'causation'
requirements . . . must be satisfied before the felony-murder rule may be applied"); Commonwealth
v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 192, 53 A.2d 736, 742 (1947) (where causal contribution is strong, actor is
responsible for result as if he produced it himself); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 572, 55 S.W.
961, 964 (1900) ("The whole [felony-murder] question here is one of causal connection.").
85. See Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 998-99 (1959)
("Criminal acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficiently dependent upon the encour-
agement and material support of the group as a whole to warrant treating each member as a causal
agent to each act.") (emphasis added).
86. This rule patently demonstrates its reliance upon a causal theory since it applies only where
additional offenses are consequences of the defendant's underlying offense. The court in Breaz v. State,
214 Ind. 31, 13 N.E.2d 952 (1938), for example, gives the following causal explanation for the natu-
ral and probable consequence rule:
It is true that to connect one with a crime as an accessory before the fact it is necessary that
there be an immediate causal connection between the instigation and the act, but this does not
require that the act consummated shall be, in all its details, the precise one previously contem-
plated by the parties ....
"There can be no doubt of the general rule of law, that a person engaged in the commission
of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines and confederates with others. . . he is liable
criminaliter for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution
of the common design, as one of its probable and natural consequences ..
Id. at 34-35, 13 N.E.2d at 953.
87. Sayre, supra note 79, at 702 (criticizing courts' tendencies to rely on broader notions of re-
spondeat superior).
88. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
89. See O'Keefe & Shipiro, Personal Criminal Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug & Cos-
taetic Act: The Dotterweich Doctrine, 30 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 5, 24 (1975). The degree of causal
connection necessary has been described by courts in various ways. Compare United States v. Kaadt,
171 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1948) (requiring responsibility for conduct of business and directing that
responsibilities be assessed by evaluating the extent of defendant's direction and control over business)
with United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1947) (finding ade-
quate basis for liability in defendant's initiation of events that placed prohibited commodity in stream
of commerce), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
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satisfaction of the objective elements of the offense by another. Often the
contribution is at least as strong as in most complicity cases and his liabil-
ity is justified.9"
But doctrines of imputation have also resulted in liability where the
defendant's causal connection to the harm is tenuous at best. Under the
complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule, a co-felon has been held for
murder when a gangleader, annoyed by one member of the gang, shot and
killed the offending member.91 The Pinkerton doctrine has been used to
hold an actor liable for a series of abortions performed without her knowl-
edge by a doctor to whom she had on other occasions referred women for
abortions.92 Under the natural and probable consequence rule in complic-
ity, a passenger in a car has been held liable for second degree murder
when the driver, operating a vehicle on the wrong side of the road, killed
a pedestrian. Both driver and passenger were drinking, and the passenger
was held to be part of the unlawful enterprise of drinking and driving.9"
Under vicarious liability rules, a store owner has been held liable for an
employee's unlawful sale of oleomargarine in direct violation of the own-
er's orders.9" And in United States v. Park,95 the president of Acme Mar-
kets, Inc., was held liable for the contamination of food in a company
warehouse despite his lack of personal control over the warehouse and his
ignorance of the contamination."
If the perceived basis for the imputation of the objective element is the
causal connection, then where the connection is weak-as in these latter
cases-the imputation should be considered unjustified. Indeed, the vari-
ous doctrines and rules that impute objective elements are criticized in
inverse proportion to the strength of the causal connection. Causing crime
by an innocent is clearly accepted, and is almost subsumed by the causa-
tion issue. Complicity is widely accepted, although in some cases it has
90. See United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1980) (liability for mail fraud under
Pinkerton doctrine where fraudulent bills were mailed to pay bribe defendant had extracted); United
States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1974) (liability of organization official for food adulteration,
where defendant failed to correct, and then failed to require his agent to correct, conditions causing
adulteration); Breaz v. State, 214 Ind. 31, 13 N.E.2d 952 (1938) (natural and probable consequence
liability where robbery defendant directed, equipped, and profited from robbery ring he did not plan);
State v. Rosania, 33 N.J. 267, 163 A.2d 139 (1960) (liability for murder based on complicity in
underlying robbery where defendant planned operation in detail), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 864 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Zehner Bros. Farm Prods., 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 501 (Columbia County Ct. 1972)
(vicarious liability for unlawful discharge of industrial waste where employer ordered employee to
spray dangerous insecticide on land near stream).
91. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939) (discussed supra note 25).
92. Anderson v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 22, 177 P.2d 315 (1947).
93. Berness v. State, 40 Ala. App. 198, 202-03, 113 So. 2d 178, 180 (1958), cert. denied, 269
Ala. 694, 113 So. 2d 183 (1959).
94. Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N.E. 769 (1908).
95. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
96. Id. at 672-73.
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been limited to instances of "substantial assistance."197 Felony murder, the
Pinkerton doctrine, the natural and probable consequence rule, and vicari-
ous liability have all been strongly criticized for their potential imposition
of liability where the causal connection is weak."8 Special rules governing
liability for corporate officials have escaped similar criticism so far, per-
haps because of the growing concern over "white-collar" crimes and of-
fenders. Introducing a minimum causal contribution requirement into
each doctrine that relies on a causal theory would reduce criticism and do
much to insure rational imputation.
The analogy among these causal theory doctrines of imputation does
more than illustrate the importance of the causal connection. It leads one
to question variations in the culpability requirements among the different
doctrines. Two distinct culpable states of mind are pertinent: the actor's
culpability as to causing, assisting, or encouraging another to satisfy the
objective elements; and the actor's culpability as to the objective elements
specified in the definition of the offense. The distinction is sometimes sub-
tle, but one's state of mind as to whether one's conduct will assist the
97. Substantial assistance is often required where the state of mind as to assistance must be know-
ing rather than purposeful. The Brown Commission, for example, recommended that legislatures
replace the traditional purposefulness requirement with the requirement that the actor "knowingly
provides substantial assistance." NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROWN COMMISSION]. The
drafters of the Model Penal Code considered but rejected a similar provision. Compare MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) with id. § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The purposefulness requirement is most common. See infra note 100; Robinson & Grail, supra note
10, at 739.
98. See T. MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE INDIAN LAW COMMISSIONERS AND
PUBLISHED BY COMMAND OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL 65 (1837) (note M)
("It would be a less capricious, and therefore a more salutary course, to provide that every fiftieth or
every hundredth thief selected by lot should be hanged" than to punish as murder unforeseeable
homicides committed during the course of a felony.); Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-Murder
Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191, 206-07 (criticizing complicity aspect of felony-murder rule on ground
that felon has too little control over co-felons). Many jurisdictions have attempted to strengthen the
causation requirements of their felony-murder statutes. See supra notes 44-45; W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 15, § 71, at 557.
The Pinkerton doctrine is less widely accepted than the felony-murder rule. See id. § 65, at 515.
The Model Penal Code commentary explains the drafters' rejection of the Pinkerton doctrine: "Law
would lose all sense of just proportion if in virtue of that one crime, each were held accountable for
thousands of offenses that he did not influence at all." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) comment 1, at
21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953). Others have argued: "Aiding should mean something more than the
attenuated connection resulting solely from membership in a conspiracy and the objective standard of
what is reasonably foreseeable." 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 156
(1970).
Objections to the natural and probable consequence rule generally center upon its imputation of
requisite mental states rather than weak causal connection. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
15, § 30, at 516.
For criticism of the tenuous causal connection in cases of vicarious liability, see Sayre, supra note
79, at 702.
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perpetrator in causing a result, for example, is distinguishable from one's
state of mind as to the result of the perpetrator's conduct.99
Only the doctrines governing complicity and causing crime by an inno-
cent require the latter kind of culpability. Under rules governing complic-
ity, the state of mind that is required as to causing or assisting an-
other-the first culpability issue-is "purposefully" or, in some
jurisdictions, "knowingly."100 Under the doctrine of causing crime by an
innocent, an actor must knowingly or perhaps recklessly cause the conduct
of the innocent.1 01 Under both forms of liability, the culpability require-
ment for causing or assisting another is commonly a certain minimum that
applies to all offenses, no matter what level of culpability is required for
the offense (e.g., the same culpability as to assistance is required for com-
plicity in murder and for complicity in reckless homicide).
In contrast, the second culpability issue for imputation-the culpability
required by the substantive offense-obviously varies with the offense.
One is not an accomplice to murder unless one is knowing or purposeful
99. One may want to assist the perpetrator, but also wish that a possible harmful result not occur.
For example, if A and B are engaged in a robbery, A may desire to assist B in the robbery even
though A realizes that his assistance will increase the chance of B's wounding the robbery victim. A
may nonetheless not want the wounding to occur. See State v. Edwards, 209 Kan. 681, 498 P.2d 48
(1972); cf. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939) (defendants desired to assist
in armed robbery but surely would have preferred that one co-felon not shoot another, although they
may have been aware of such risk).
One rhiay act to create only a risk that one's conduct will assist or cause the perpetrator to effectuate
a desired result. A may desire B's death and place a poisoned apple where B will be likely to eat it,
thereby creating only a risk of assisting B in causing B's own death. Cf. Queen v. Saunders & Archer,
2 Pl. Cam. 473, 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1575) (defendant intended to cause his wife to cause her own
death, but mother fed poisoned apple to child).
100. The defendant must have either a purpose to assist or encourage or, in some jurisdictions,
simply have knowledge of the fact that he is assisting or encouraging. The majority of United States
codes require purposeful or intentional assistance. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1970); Criminal Code of 1961 § 5-2, ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05 (West 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-6 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1975); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
306 (Purdon 1973); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 1974); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.05
(West 1982). Most states that do not explicitly codify an intentional aid requirement impose it
through case law. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, § 64, at 508.
A handful of jurisdictions codify a knowing standard. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-4 (Bums
1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(3)(a) (1977). England also applies a knowing standard.
See G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 293 (1978).
101. The Model Penal Code's provision, and most provisions patterned after it, see supra note 72,
impose liability for causing crime by an innocent when the actor does so "acting with the kind of
culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). A general provision of the Code instructs courts to impute recklessness
with respect to each result element-here, aiding-and knowing with respect to each conduct ele-
ment-here, the conduct by which one does so. See id. § 2.02(3). For a discussion of the operation of §
2.02(3), see Robinson & Grail, supra note 10, at 700-02, 715-19. For a discussion of other possible
constructions of § 2.06(2)(a), see id. at 732-44.
The comparable federal statute requires that the actor "willfully" cause the innocent's conduct. 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982). Federal courts have considered proof of negligent causation sufficient for liabil-
ity. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (since use of mail by innocent could "reason-
ably be foreseen," defendant guilty of mail fraud).
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as to causing the death. One is not an accomplice to reckless or negligent
homicide unless one is reckless or negligent as to causing the death. Such
a requirement of culpability as to the definitional elements is explicit in
many provisions governing causing crime by an innocent but is ambiguous
in many complicity provisions.10 2
These culpability requirements for complicity and for causing crime by
an innocent reveal another basis-beyond tenuous causal connections-for
criticizing some of the doctrines that use causal theories to impute re-
quired elements. Under the complicity aspect of felony murder, the Pin-
kerton doctrine, and the natural and probable consequence rule, a defend-
ant may be held liable for an offense even though he does not satisfy the
culpability requirements of the offense. 03 The same criticism may be di-
rected at vicarious liability and corporate officials' liability. Under the last
two doctrines, none of the culpability elements of the offense need be
proven,1° and even a requirement of culpability as to assisting or contrib-
uting to the conduct is sometimes foregone." 5
As noted previously, the complicity aspect of felony murder, the Pinker-
ton doctrine, the natural and probable consequence rule, and vicarious
and corporate officials' liability are often supported by weak causal con-
nections. The impropriety of imposition of liability on the basis of such
weak causal connections is further exacerbated because it is these same
doctrines and rules that also fail to require either culpability as to causing
or culpability as to the elements of the offense. All of these doctrines
would be more acceptable if they deviated less from the requirements that
are persuasive bases for imputing objective elements under a causal the-
ory: a strong causal connection with the imputed objective element, culpa-
102. The defendant must also act with the mental culpability necessary for the commission of the
offense. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-8 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-226 (1976); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1975). In some codes, however, the requirement is unclear. Compare
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (addressing only culpability as to
result in complicity cases) with id. § 2.06(2)(a) (requiring "kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of the offense" for causing crime by innocent).
103. The complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule, for example, has been applied both when
the actual killer intended the killing, United States v. Carter, 445 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1972), and when he did it accidentally, Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408
A.2d 711 (1979). The doctrine also has been applied whether or not the defendant-accomplice antici-
pated the killing. See Carter, 445 F.2d at 672 (although co-felon's homicidal act may have been "far
from [defendant's] mind . . . his participation in the robbery . . . made him guilty of murder").
For a discussion of imputation of mental states under the natural and probable consequence rule
and the Pinkerton doctrine, see, respectively, United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (discussed supra note 24); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (discussed supra
note 23).
104. See Prather v. United States, 9 App. D.C. 82, aff'd, 164 U.S. 452 (1896) (vicarious liabil-
ity). For a discussion of the imputation of required culpability elements for the liability of officials
within an organization, see supra note 27.
105. See supra notes 26-27 (vicarious liability and the liability of officials within an
organization).
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bility as to the causal connection, and the culpability required by the sub-
stantive offense. Circumstances may justify minor relaxation of one or
another of these three requirements. For example, it may be appropriate
to permit a weaker causal connection for homicide liability when the actor
is engaged in a serious felony. But relaxing any one increases the impor-
tance of adhering to the others if the result is to accord with our intuitive
sense of justice.
2. Causing Oneself to Engage in Criminal Conduct
The causal theory for imputing objective elements has a counterpart for
imputing mental elements: A required mental element will be imputed to
an actor if he is causally responsible for criminal conduct committed in the
absence of the mental element. One of the obvious cases of imputed
mental elements based upon such a causal theory is that of voluntary in-
toxication. Where an actor's intoxication negates a required mental ele-
ment, the element will nevertheless be imputed if the intoxication was
voluntary. 06 It is this same concern for an actor's culpability for causing
his own disability that supports analogous results when an actor causes in
himself conditions of a general excuse such as hypnotism, duress, impaired
consciousness, involuntary act, or somnambulism.
10 7
There is a conceptual similarity between the defendant's voluntarily be-
coming intoxicated and then committing a crime, and the defendant's
causing another person to become intoxicated who then commits a
crime.10 8 This analogy between the doctrines of voluntary intoxication and
causing crime by an innocent suggests both a basis for criticizing current
rules on voluntary intoxication and a proposal for their reform.
There are several problems with the current rejection of a failure of
proof defense for offenses committed following voluntary intoxication. 0"
First, for some offenses, it permits a court to impute required culpabil-
ity-recklessness under many modern codes-even though the definition
of voluntary intoxication requires only negligence. To find that intoxica-
tion was self-induced, the Model Penal Code, for example, requires only
106. The theory is not a new one. In Aristotle's words: "[W]e punish a man for his very igno-
rance, if he is thought responsible for the ignorance ...for the moving principle is in the man
himself, since he had the powers of not getting druk and his getting drunk was the cause of his
ignorance." ARISrOTLE, ETHiCA NICOMACHEA 1113 (W. Ross trans. 1931).
107. For a discussion of cases dealing with culpability in causing an excusing condition, see 2 P.
RoBINSON, supra note 2, at § 162.
108. In both cases, the "causer" has two possible objectives: to bring about the harmful result, and
to bring it about through an agent who will not be held responsible because of the lack of a culpable
state of mind at the time the agent committed the offense. In both cases, it seems appropriate to
consider the actor's state of mind regarding both objectives at the time he created the condition that
caused the subsequent absence of the mental state, whether his own or another's. See id.
109. For a discussion of this rejection and its alternate rationales, see infra pp. 661-62.
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that the actor "knows or ought to know"' 0 that the substance tends to
intoxicate-a requirement of mere negligence. Assume an actor kills a pe-
destrian while driving at a speed that he should know risks such a death.
In fact, he does not know of such a risk because of his voluntary intoxica-
tion. The Model Penal Code would convict him of reckless homicide de-
spite this lack of awareness. Further, he would be convicted of reckless
homicide even if he were only negligent in becoming drunk-even if, for
example, he ate what he believed was a sugar cube, but which he should
have known might contain an intoxicating substance."'
Second, this imputation of recklessness is objectionable because even if
the actor had been reckless or even purposeful as to getting intoxicated, it
does not follow that he is in fact reckless as to causing the death of a
pedestrian. It is commonly presumed that a person risks all manner of
resulting harm when he voluntarily becomes intoxicated,"1 but this is not
necessarily correct. Hawaii, in rejecting the Model Penal Code's provi-
sion, notes just this objection: "It equates the defendant's becoming drunk
with the reckless disregard by him of risks created by his subsequent con-
duct and thereby forecloses the issue." '1
In contrast, liability for causing another to become intoxicated and to
commit an offense-under special rules governing causing crime by an
innocent-requires at least recklessness as to actually causing the other's
intoxication and, more importantly, requires that the defendant have the
culpability required by the substantive offense.1 1 4 The analogy between
causing crime by an innocent and voluntary self-intoxication suggests that
the former doctrine's requirements ought to apply to cases under the latter
doctrine. The actor's liability for the ultimate offense should depend upon
his conduct in causing his own excused conduct, and his accompanying
culpable state of mind at the time of such initial conduct and with respect
to his commission of the ultimate offense. Thus, where the actor arranges
for a hypnotist to give him a hypnotic suggestion to kill his wife, the actor
should be held liable for intentionally killing his wife. Such liability does
not rest on his excused conduct-killing while in a hypnotic state-but
rather on his earlier conduct of going to and making the arrangements
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
111. The Model Penal Code's definition of "self-induced intoxication" is also inadequate because
it does not account for situations in which an actor may know the intoxicating effect of drinking, but
is not fully responsible for that drinking, e.g., a chronic alcoholic. Id; see 2 P. RoBINsON, supra note
2, at §§ 162, 194.
112. Thus, it was held that voluntary intoxication could not negate "specific intent," State v.
Shipman, 354 Mo. 265, 189 S.W.2d 273 (1945), or malice aforethought, Newsome v. State, 214 Ark.
48, 50, 214 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1948).
113. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-230 commentary (1976).
114. See supra pp. 637-38.
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with the hypnotist with the intention of causing the subsequent death of
his wife.
The actor may have such a culpable state of mind as to the commission
of the offense when he causes the disability, as in going to the hypnotist,
or when he fails to make allowance for a pre-existing disability. For ex-
ample, in Fain v. Commonwealth, Fain suffered from a disability that
rendered him violent when awakened.115 Knowing this, he went to sleep
in a hotel lobby with a gun in his possession; when roused, Fain shot the
person who woke him. 1 ' His liability is properly determined by asking
whether, when he failed to account for his disability, he was aware that
such failure might subsequently cause physical injury to others. If he was
aware of a risk of such injury, he should be convicted of reckless wound-
ing; if he intended such injury to other persons, he should be convicted of
intentional wounding. Fain, then, should have been punished for his
"breach of social duty in going to sleep in the public room of a hotel with
a deadly weapon on his person. ' 1 Since he "[no doubt] knew . . . his
propensity to do acts of violence when aroused from sleep," ' he should
have been held liable for reckless homicide based upon his earlier conduct
of going to sleep while armed, in disregard of the attendant risks.
This form of culpability-in-causing analysis is preferable to current vol-
untary intoxication rules for a variety of reasons. First, it makes clear that
an actor who brings about conduct that causes a death should be liable no
matter who actually commits the killing. For example, under this analysis,
the result in the hypnosis hypothetical is the same whether the defendant
arranges with the hypnotist to have himself hypnotized to kill his wife or
to have someone else hypnotized to do it. As long as there is precedent for
holding persons liable for causing irresponsible agents to engage in crimi-
nal conduct, " ' it should not change the analysis if the irresponsible agent
that the actor causes to commit the offense is another person or the actor
himself.
Second, this form of analysis properly accounts for different degrees of
culpability as to the ultimate criminal conduct. If, at the time of causing
the disability and excusing conditions, the actor is reckless as to ultimately
causing a death, then he may properly be held liable for reckless homi-
cide. If the actor should but does not know that a notorious hypnotist may
give him a hypnotic suggestion to kill his wife, then he is negligent as to
115. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 188 (1879).
116. Id. at 192-93.
117. Id. at 193.
118. Id. at 192-93. The court, however, concluded that Fain could not be held liable because the
earlier conduct, going to sleep, was not criminal, and the later conduct, killing in a somnambulistic
state, was excused. Id.
119. See supra note 72.
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causing her death if he voluntarily goes to the hypnotist and later kills his
wife under hypnotic suggestion.12 In the context of intoxication, this
means that one must inquire into the actor's state of mind as to the ele-
ments of the offense at the time he voluntarily becomes intoxicated. If he
is on his way to a robbery, the situation in one reported case, 1 ' then he is
properly held liable for the subsequent offense even though at the time of
the robbery he is not responsible for his criminal conduct.
There is some precedent for this method of analysis, primarily in cases
of pre-existing disabilities where the actor's culpability is in his failure to
prevent a harmful result. In State v. Gooze, for example, the defendant
had a history of blackouts from M6ni~re's Syndrome.'22 During one such
blackout he ran over a pedestrian. The court pointed out that "[i]t was
reasonably foreseeable that if he 'blacked out' or became dizzy without
warning, its probable consequences might well be injury or death to
others."' 23 The court then held, "while one cannot be liable for what he
does during the unconsciousness of sleep, he is responsible for allowing
himself to go to sleep.'
24
3. Creating Dangerous Situations
The conceptual similarity between causing harm through a human
agent, such as a drunken actor, and through an instrumentality, such as a
crowbar or gorilla, is the actor's causal responsibility for the results. Such
causal responsibility is similar in many respects to a causal theory that
bases liability upon the creation of a dangerous situation. Where an actor
enters a bank, with a loaded gun drawn, and fosters confusion and anxi-
ety, he creates a risk of harm and is arguably causally responsible for and
properly held accountable for harm that ensues. Indeed, one could argue
that all but the most direct cases of agents and instrumentalities-all but
the crowbar case-create only a risk, not a certainty of harm.
Thus, in general terms, the imputation of required elements under a
causal theory might be viewed as imputation based upon an actor's causal
responsibility for creating the dangerous situation in which the harm or
120. Where the ultimate offense is never committed, the defendant may nonetheless be liable for
an attempt to commit the offense. For example, if the hypnotist refuses to comply with the actor's
request and reports the request to the police, the actor may be held liable for attempted murder.
121. DeBerry v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. Ct.
122. 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (App. Div. 1951). Mniire's Syndrome is a form of audi-
tory vertigo apparently produced by hemorrhage within the inner ear. Symptoms include dizziness
and nausea. HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2153-54 (10th ed. 1983).
123. Id. at 286, 81 A.2d at 816.
124. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. at 286, 81 A.2d at 816. The approach has also been employed where
the actor culpably causes a defense that negates an element of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Manus,
93 N.M. 95, 100, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (1979) (defendant cannot claim provocation when he intention-
ally caused decedent to undertake "provocative" act).
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evil can occur absent the culpable state of mind normally required by the
offense. Under this theory, one could argue that if a required element can
be imputed to an actor when he creates a dangerous situation by volun-
tarily becoming intoxicated or intoxicating another, it should also be im-
puted where he voluntarily creates a dangerous situation through other
means. Thus, by robbing a bank the actor creates at least a risk that
someone may be accidentally harmed. In the anxiety and confusion of the
moment, a customer or employee may fall, be stepped on, or suffer a heart
attack. A gun may accidentally discharge when the intruder or a guard
trips or panics. If such accidents result in death, the actor might not have,
at the moment of the killing, the culpability required for mur-
der-purpose, knowledge, or recklessness manifesting extreme indiffer-
ence to the value of human life-just as these elements may not be present
at the moment of a drunken killing. But just as it would be improper to
limit one's perspective to the actor's state of mind at the moment of the
drunken killing, so too would it be improper to consider only his state of
mind at the time of the accidental killing.
If the felony-murder rule and similar doctrines of imputed liability rely
on this causal theory of risk creation,125 then they must also adhere to the
logical limitations of such a theory. When an actor voluntarily becomes
intoxicated, thereby creating the risk of causing a death, for example,
modern criminal codes will impute only the culpability of reckless homi-
cide, not murder.' Although liability for reckless homicide is inadequate
in the unusual case where an actor becomes intoxicated knowing or in-
125. Such analysis seems to be the basis for the now common felony-murder requirement that the
underlying felony be one that is dangerous to life. The rule that requires that the death be causally
connected with the felony also supports this analysis. In Regina v. Sern , for example, Judge Stephen
argued:
I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which
causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be
dangerous to life, and likely to in itself cause death done for the purpose of committing a
felony which caused death, should be murder.
16 Cox's Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (Central Crim. Ct. 1887) (emphasis added).
One might argue that strict liability and suspension of the concurrence requirement may also some-
times rely on the creation of dangerous situations. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)
(strict liability case relying on same rationale); Thabo Meli v. Regina, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 228, [1954] 1
All E.R. 373 (by engaging in conduct that he believed caused death, defendant created situation in
which he subsequently caused death without required culpability); Wasserstrom, supra note 66, at
743 (certain instances of strict liability "can be interpreted as legislative judgments that persons who
intentionally engage in certain activities and occupy some peculiar or distinctive position of control are
to be held accountable for the occurrence of certain consequences").
126. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); accord authorities cited
i?!fra note 200. The Code imputes such culpability by rendering "immaterial" the unawareness of the
risk of death if the actor was voluntarily intoxicated, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962), even though such an awareness normally is required for reckless homicide, see
id. § 2.02(2)(c); id. § 210.3 (1980). This negative formulation-"such unawareness is immate-
rial'"-is deficient because it fails to specify what the prosecution must prove.
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tending that he will, in an intoxicated state, commit the offense,127 convic-
tion for reckless homicide generally is adequate for such lethal risk crea-
tion. If the felony-murder rule relies upon a similar theory of risk
creation, how can it impute the culpability of murder rather than that of
reckless homicide?
The answer may be that while the causal theory of risk creation does
not fully explain liability for murder, that causal theory combined with
another does. The felony-murder rule may in fact combine the causal the-
ory of the dangerous situation-which accounts for the actor's liability for
reckless homicide-with the culpability of the underlying felony (e.g.,
bank robbery) to produce a single "cumulative culpability" equal to
murder.12
While a theory of risk creation alone may suggest limiting liability to
offenses requiring recklessness as to a result, it does not require limitation
based on the identity of the actor who causes the harm once that situation
is created. Just as the causal theory for intoxication should operate con-
sistently whether the actor causes his own or another's intoxication, the
doctrines based upon the causal theory of creation of dangerous situations
should operate without regard to the identity of the person who actually
causes the "accidental" harm or evil. For example, where the actor's re-
sponsibility derives from his conduct in culpably causing the circumstances
in which an accidental killing occurs, as in felony murder, it should be
irrelevant whether the immediate cause of the accident is his own faultless
slip of the trigger or someone else's. Perhaps for this reason the felony-
murder rule applies to killings by the defendant or by a co-felon, and in
some jurisdictions, by a victim, an innocent bystander, or a policeman.129
Similarly, the imputation of required elements under the complicity and
127. See supra pp. 641-42.
128. Cumulative culpability is discussed infra pp. 650-52.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 445 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (killing of victim by co-
felon), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1972); People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364
(1939) (killing of one co-felon by another); Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979)
(accidental killing of hostage by officer); People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 514, 52 N.W.2d 201,
203-04 (officer killed by bullet from another officer's gun), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952); Com-
monwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955) (co-felon killed himself), rev'd on other
grounds, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 931 (1958).
Some recent codifications limit liability to killings committed by co-felons. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-1502(1)(a) (1977) (under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (Supp. 1983);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (1977).
Jurisdictions also divide over whether a felon should be held liable for felony murder where a co-
felon is the victim. Compare ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(2) (Supp. 1983) (any person) with
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975) (person other than a participant). If creation of
danger is the rationale for felony-murder liability, the identity of the victim should be irrelevant. Cf
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (ambiguous whether court limits liabil-
ity on basis of identity of person doing killing, or on basis of victim, or on basis of the particular
combination in that case-killer/police officer, victim/co-felon).
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innocent-party-killing aspects of the felony-murder rule also depends on
this causal theory: The actor may not satisfy the culpability or objective
elements required for the offense, but he caused the circumstances in
which the killing was likely to occur. He may not have intended the kill-
ing, but by engaging in an armed robbery with another he intentionally
contributed to the creation of the circumstances that caused the killing by
his co-felon or by an innocent party.130
The same analysis appears in cases arising under the Pinkerton doc-
trine and the natural and probable consequence rule in complicity. In
Pinkerton, Justice Douglas relied upon the causal responsibility language
of complicity theory to justify holding each co-conspirator liable for of-
fenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy: "Each conspirator in-
stigated the commission of the crime. '131 Similarly, the natural and prob-
able consequence rule relies upon a causal theory of risk creation on its
face, as noted previously: The actor is liable for offenses when he creates
the risk of the criminal result by his complicity in an underlying course of
criminal conduct.
1 32
An analogous argument supports liability imposed under the doctrines
of vicarious liability and organizational liability: An actor is liable for his
contribution to the circumstances giving rise to the criminal conduct or
result despite his lack of intent, knowledge, or recklessness, just as he is
liable for causing prohibited conduct or results absent a culpable state of
mind due to voluntary self-intoxication. Even in Park, where the causal
connection was clearly attenuated, the Court relied upon this sort of the-
ory to hold the president of a supermarket chain criminally liable for the
presence of adulterated food in a company warehouse. Park may have
been entirely ignorant of the violation, but it was by his own earlier inac-
tion that the contamination occurred. 3
While each of these instances of imputed mental elements may have
some foundation in a causal theory of risk creation, it does not follow that
130. See Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 442, 408 A.2d 711,718 (1979) (defendants "were just as
much the cause of [victim's] death as if each had fired the fatal shot" where their actions exposed their
hostages to gunfire). See generally J. HAIL, supra note 63, at 274-81 (discussing causal theories for
felony-murder liability).
131. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
132. For example, in United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court up-
held the accessory's conviction for second-degree murder, reasoning that: "The murder here was a
natural and probable consequence of [the accessory's] actions which permitted Clayborne to fight with
the decedent with his hands free and to shoot him with a loaded weapon." Id. at 481.
133. Chief Justice Burger stated:
[T]he defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority
either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and
... he failed to do so. The failure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the
corporate agent's authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal link.
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975) (emphasis added).
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each is justifiable in the form now applied by the courts. Using an actor's
causal responsibility as the basis for imputation should require more than
a showing of simple causal connection.1"" By analogy to complicity and to
causing crime by an innocent, the defendant should also possess a mini-
mum culpable state of mind as to the causal connection and the culpable
state of mind required by the definition of the offense.
The doctrines imputing elements under a causal theory of risk creation
generally require a minimum culpable state of mind as to the causal con-
nection, although the required level of culpability sometimes drops to neg-
ligence rather than the purposefulness (or in some jurisdictions, knowl-
edge) required under a complicity theory of liability. Under the Model
Penal Code, for example, the imputation of a required mental state for
"self-induced intoxication"'1 5 will apply whenever "the actor knowingly
introduces into his body [the substances causing intoxication], the tendency
of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know."136 While this
provision requires that the actor knowingly ingest the intoxicant, it per-
mits imputation even when he is only negligent as to its intoxicating ef-
fect, that is, where he is only negligent in causing circumstances in which
he may behave criminally without the requisite mental state.
Similarly, as the discussion of general causal theories shows, the felony-
murder doctrine, the Pinkerton doctrine, and the natural and probable
consequence rule in complicity require only negligence as to causing or
contributing to the conduct of the perpetrator, at least where the doctrines
are limited to foreseeable offenses. The doctrines of vicarious liability and
organizational official liability often require no culpability as to causing
or contributing to the perpetrator's conduct or as to causing the circum-
stances giving rise to the conduct, although in light of the relationship
between the defendant and the perpetrator, or the defendant's position of
responsibility in the organization, negligence may often be present in
fact.1
3 7
The second culpable state of mind requirement for general causal theo-
ries-proof of the culpable state of mind required by the substantive of-
fense-does not have the same application under causal theories of risk
creation because the rules and doctrines supported by these theories im-
pute the required mental elements. However, where the theory supports
the imputation of only some of the required mental states of the offense
134. See supra pp. 637-38 (relation to direct causal theories).
135. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (specifying circumstances
under which it is immaterial that actor is unaware of risk because of self-induced intoxication).
136. Id. § 2.08(5)(b) (defining "self-induced intoxication").
137. See infra p. 657.
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charged, the prosecution should be obliged to prove those not expressly
imputed." 8"
4. Substituting Equivalent Culpability
Under Model Penal Code section 2.04(2), which codifies the doctrine of
substituted mental elements, the culpable mental state required for an of-
fense will be imputed to the actor if he had the culpable state of mind for
another offense."39 The doctrine of transferred intent can be justified
under an analogous theory of substituting equivalent culpability: The in-
tention toward the intended victim is taken as an adequate substitute for
the required intention toward the actual victim.140
138. In instances of involuntary intoxication, for example, the intoxication may negate only one of
many required mental elements. The element negated by the intoxication will be imputed. Required
mental states that are not present and whose absence is not caused by the intoxication should not be
imputed, however, and their absence should provide a defense.
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted supra note 21). The
equivalency rationale for this imputation is evinced by the Code's mitigation of sentencing: "[T]he
ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he
may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he
supposed." Id. Arkansas, Hawaii, and New Jersey have adopted § 2.04(2). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
206(4) (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-219 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:2-4(b) (West 1982).
Other jurisdictions have adopted § 2.04(2) but have done so without adopting this sentencing provi-
sion. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 501.070(2) (1975); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 37(3) (1983). The
failure to adopt the mitigation-of-sentencing provision seems to undermine the justification for impu-
tation. Several older, but still valid penal codes have provisions that appear to reach the same result.
These codes define the attempt to commit a crime in a way so as "not [to] protect a person who, in
attempting unsuccessfully to commit a crime, accomplishes the commission of another and different
crime, whether of greater or less guilt, from suffering the punishment prescribed by law for the crime
committed." CAL. PENAL CODE § 665 (West 1970); accord IDAHO CODE § 18-307 (1979); OK.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 43 (West 1958).
The doctrine of substituted mental elements, as embodied in § 2.04(2), might well be broad enough
to include imputation covered by transferred intent and suspension of the concurrence requirement,
since in both instances the actor intends to commit another offense, as § 2.04(2) requires. In the
transferred intent case, A would be denied a defense under § 2.04(2) because he would have been
guilty of an offense-murder of X-if the situation had been as he supposed. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.04(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Similarly, in the suspension of concurrence case, A
would be denied a defense to murder because he would have been guilty of an offense-abuse of B's
corpse, id. § 250.10 (1980)-had the situation been as he supposed. Id. § 2.04(2) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). See generally Williams, The Mental Element in Crime, 27 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 193,
211-12 (1957-1958) (suggesting application of § 2.04 to cases of transferred malice). For a discussion
of possible inconsistencies resulting from the apparent overlap of §§ 2.03 and 2.04, see infra note 151.
One might argue, however, that § 2.03(2)(a) and (3)(a) apply only to mistakes as to a result, i.e.,
accidents, and that § 2.04(2) applies only to mistakes as to circumstance elements. See infra p. 648.
140. See Tolen v. State, 49 Ala. App. 353, 355, 272 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (1972) ("If a person,
shooting at another, kills a third person, his guilt is the same as if he had killed the person for whom
the shot was intended."), cert. denied, 289 Ala. 752, 272 So. 2d 281 (1973).
The equivalency doctrine explains provisions that define murder as an act done "with the intent to
cause the death of a person other than himself, [whereby the actor] causes the death of that person or
of another person." MICH. 2D PROPOSED REV., supra note 42, at § 2005(1)(a) (emphasis added);
accord ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(1) (1982); AI.ASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-1502(1)(b) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(a) (1978); Criminal Code of 1961 § 9-
1(a)(1), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); Ky. REv. STAT. §
507.020(1)(a) (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(1) (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §
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Some writers have suggested that the language of section 2.04(2) is
broad enough to cover the transferred intent cases,141 rendering unneces-
sary those parts of Model Penal Code section 2.03 that codify the doctrine
of transferred intent.142 It is true that in the bad-aim case, typical of the
transferred intent doctrine, there is an intention to commit an offense
other than the one actually committed, as required by section 2.04(2).
Nonetheless, it seems clear that drafters of the Model Penal Code did not
intend any overlap between the two sections. Section 2.04(2) governs situ-
ations where "ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to
the offense charged, 1 43 while section 2.03 applies where "a particular
result is an element of an offense"1 44 and determines whether a result
element is or is not established if "the actual result differs from that
designed or contemplated" 1' or "from the probable result. 1 46 The for-
mer section concerns "mistakes"; the latter "accidents." The former im-
putes a circumstance element; the latter imputes a result element.
1 47
While the doctrines of substituted mental elements and transferred in-
tent may not overlap, they are analogous. There is no apparent reason
why the requirements for or results of imputation under analogous theo-
ries should differ when the imputed culpability applies to a circumstance
rather than a result. Yet the doctrines do, perhaps inadvertently, impose
different requirements and can generate different results.
Section 2.03 limits imputation to instances in which the actual result
differs from that designed, contemplated, or risked "only in the respect
that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that
the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more exten-
sive than that caused. 1 48 This limitation attempts to assure a general
equivalence between the culpability present and that imputed. In contrast,
section 2.04(2) places no limitation on the "ignorance or mistake"-the
culpability as to a circumstance-that may trigger imputation of the req-
uisite culpability. While the literal language of the provision permits the
actor's culpable mental state for any other offense to provide the basis for
imputation, an equivalency theory of substituted culpability would require
that the other offense entail generally similar culpability.
1 49
76-5-202(1)(c) (1978).
141. See Williams, supra note 139, at 211-12.
142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(a), (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
143. Id. § 2.04(2) (emphasis added).
144. Id. § 2.03(2), (3) (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 2.03(2)(a).
146. Id. § 2.03(3)(a).
147. For a discussion of the means for, and importance of, distinguishing conduct, circumstance,
and result elements, see Robinson & Grail, supra note 10, at 706-09, 719-25.
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
149. Such a limitation has been proposed elsewhere. See H. SILVING, CoNsTrruENT ELEMENTs
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Section 2.04(2) does, however, reduce "the grade and degree of the of-
fense of which [the actor] may be convicted to those of the offense of
which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed."150 This
reduction assures that the actor's punishment will not exceed that pre-
scribed for the offense for which the actor had the required culpability. If
the offense contemplated is not broadly equivalent to that committed and
charged, the actor's liability will be reduced accordingly. Section 2.03, in
contrast, has no similar mechanism to adjust the defendant's ultimate lia-
bility when the contemplated and actual offenses are not equivalent. And
although the stringent requirements of similarity of offenses of section
2.03 may be intended to assure the same degree of culpability as the cor-
rective mechanism of section 2.04(2), the different approaches can gener-
ate different results.151 More importantly, a code arguably should adopt a
single approach to such analogous provisions if there is a danger of dispa-
rate results. The problem, of course, is that without the conceptual frame-
work of imputed liability it is considerably more difficult to see the strong
analogy between a provision governing substituted mental elements for
mistake defenses and a provision on causation that codifies the doctrine of
transferred intent.
OF CRIME 373 (1967). The hypothetical cases given in the commentary to § 2.04(2) and its analogues
in other jurisdictions support this suggestion. See Criminal Code of 1961 § 4-8(C), IL. ArN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 4-8(c) committee comments-1961 at 280 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (offense of same sort identi-
fied-arson of store intended; arson of dwelling mistakenly committed); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.04(2) comment 2, at 137 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (same). The language is dearly broad enough,
however, to cover cases the drafters could not have intended. For example, where an actor is charged
with murder under a provision of the Model Penal Code dealing with knowing homicide, the lan-
guage of § 2.04(2) would seem to deny a defense of mistake if the actor believed he was shooting at a
tree stump and shooting at tree stumps was also unlawful. The commentary to § 2.04(2) as well as
the illustrative hypothetical suggest that the section was not intended to cover such cases: "The doc-
trine that when one intends a lesser crime he may be convicted of a graver offense committed inadver-
tently leads to anomalous results if it is generally applied in the penal law . . . ." Id.
150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For jurisdictions adopting
or failing to adopt this provision, see supra note 139.
151. For example, the defendant may shoot at and miss a civilian victim, but hit an on-duty police
officer. A provision similar to § 2.03(2)(a) would impose liability for the more serious harm, injury of
an officer (if the jurisdiction distinguishes between injury to an officer and injury to a private individ-
ual). Section 2.04(2), however, would limit the defendant's liability to that imposed for shooting a
civilian. Of course, where the defendant intended or risked a "more serious or more extensive" injury
or harm, he is not likely to gain any benefit from the use of § 2.04(2), since the penalty for the harm
intended or risked will probably be equal to or greater than that of the harm actually caused. Id. §
2.04(2).
There is a compelling argument against the application of § 2.04(2) to these problems of diver-
gence: It applies only where the mistake "would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged,"
see id. § 2.04(2). Moreover, subsections (2)(a) and (3)(a) of § 2.03 foreclose a defense where there is a
divergence betwpen the actual result and the result intended or risked.
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5. Aggregating Culpability
In some cases, imputation of the elements of a serious offense can be
justified on a finding of equivalent culpability reached by aggregating the
actor's culpability for two or more less serious offenses. Equivalency
through cumulative culpability is illustrated by cases like Thabo Meli v.
Regina, which suspend the usual requirement of concurrent action and
intent. In Meli, the defendant struck the victim with the intent to kill him
and subsequently dumped off a cliff what he believed to be the corpse,
thereby causing the death of the victim without a present intention to do
so. 52 Meli arguably committed two separate offenses, attempted murder
and negligent homicide (persons who throw bodies off cliffs are probably
at least negligent as to causing death). The relation of the two offenses
legitimates the aggregation of the two instances of culpability. The re-
quirement of this relationship also avoids an unacceptable precedent: per-
mitting such aggregation in all cases of multiple offenses. Indeed, courts
often argue that two such related acts are a single course of conduct. 53 In
any case, there is little dispute about the propriety of the result. "Ordi-
nary ideas of justice and common sense" support the result 4 and confirm
the general culpability basis of the underlying equivalency theory.
Applications of the doctrine of transferred intent, as in the bad-aim
cases, present similar situations.1 55 The actor is, by normal rules of para-
digm liability, liable for two offenses: attempted murder of the person he
misses and negligent or reckless homicide of the person he hits. 56 Using
the notion of cumulative culpability, one may aggregate the culpability of
these two offenses to impute to the actor the mental state required for
murder. The propriety of such an accumulation is even more apparent in
the transferred intent case than in the case of suspended concurrence be-
152. Thabo Meli v. Regina, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 228, [1954] 1 All E.R. 373.
153. The Meli and Jackson courts both rejected the defendant's suggested two-act analysis. Thabo
Meli v. Regina, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 228, [1954] 1 All E.R. 373; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky.
239, 38 S.W. 422 (1896). Both claimed that the defendant's acts must be viewed as one, indivisible
transaction. Thabo Meli v. Regina, [1954] 1 W.L.R. at 230, [1954] 1 All E.R. at 374; Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 100 Ky. at 265, 38 S.W. at 428. The approach is conclusory and unhelpful. In a
different case, where there was more time between the acts, the "one-transaction" analysis would
appear artificial. Ultimately, any transactional analysis of "living-cadaver" cases relies upon an as-
sessment that, for unarticulated reasons, it is simply fair to treat separate acts as if they were a single
series of acts or one transaction.
154. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 65, at 174. Although it is difficult to disagree with Williams'
conclusion, it is more difficult to say why he is correct. Adverting to common sense fails to advance the
argument against those who disagree.
155. See People v. Forrest, 131 Ill. App. 2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813 (1971) (discussed supra note 19).
156. Shooting at a person probably creates a risk of death to others that is so unjustifiable that it
constitutes negligence. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 49, at 134-36.
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cause the two offenses arise not just from what is arguably the same
course of conduct but from what is indisputably the same act.1"'
The same theory of cumulative culpability may also help explain
felony-murder cases: The culpability for the underlying felony and for the
killing-the latter being imputed under a causal theory of risk crea-
tion-are aggregated to support conviction for a higher degree of homicide
than would be justifiable otherwise.1"" By demanding that the underlying
felony contain a purpose other than the killing, the common law merger
doctrine assures that the felony and the killing are independent harms and
thus may properly be aggregated. 59
But if a cumulative theory is used to justify the aggravation of culpabil-
ity in felony murder, an actor cannot properly be convicted of both felony
murder and the underlying felony. The actor's conviction for murder takes
into account his culpability for the felony. A number of jurisdictions, in
fact, bar conviction for both felony murder and the underlying felony. 6
The failure of some jurisdictions to establish such a restraint either under-
157. Indeed, the "one act" analysis of transferred intent cases is so strong that where courts use
an equivalency rationale, it tends to be more of substituted than cumulative culpability. See Gettings
v. State, 32 Ala. App. 644, 646, 29 So. 2d 677, 680 (person, shooting at another but killing a third
person, is as guilty "as if he had killed the object of his aim"), cert. denied, 249 Ala. 87, 29 So. 2d
683 (1947).
The fact that the two offenses stem from the same act may explain the development of the doctrine
of transferred intent. The inseverable nature of an act suggests one offense in a system that tends to
focus on conduct to determine the number of offenses. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (where same conduct results in commission of more than one offense,
conviction for more than one offense is prohibited under variety of circumstances). But see Mannheim,
Mens Rea in German and English Law - II, 17 J. Comp. LEGis. & INT'L L. 246, 246-47 (1935)
(discussing treatment of transferred intent cases under German law, where liability is based on two
offenses-attempted murder and negligent homicide).
158. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939) (discussed supra note 25;
intent to commit robbery justified imputation of culpability for first-degree murder; law adds intent to
kill to intent to commit felony); see also Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1384-85 (1979) (arguing that felony murder may be
analyzed by treating felony and homicide as package and determining whether aggravation of penal-
ties thus authorized is grossly disproportionate to actor's blameworthiness).
159. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 388, 491 P.2d 793, 802, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1971) (while
burglary with intent to assault may not form basis for felony-murder charge, armed robbery-crime
with felonious purpose independent of homicide-may); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539, 450
P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198 (1969) (felony murder does not apply when felony, such as
assault with deadly weapon, is "integral part of the homicide"); State v. Cook, 560 S.W.2d 299, 304
(Mo. App. 1977) (underlying felony cannot be integral part of homicide). Contra Baker v. State, 236
Ga. 754, 756-57, 225 S.E.2d 269, 271-72 (1976) (court expressly rejected merger doctrine that pro-
hibited felony-murder instruction where underlying felony is integral part of homcide). See generally
I P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 103 (discussing merger doctrine).
160. See United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
977 (1974); Sampson v. State, 400 So. 2d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Frye v. State, 37 Md. App.
476, 378 A.2d 155 (1977), aff'd, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978); People v. Wilder, 411 Mich.
328, 308 N.W.2d 112 (1981); State v. Hubbard, 123 N.J. Super. 345, 303 A.2d 87 (App. Div. 1973).
For statutes that seem to preclude conviction for the underlying felony when the defendant has been
convicted of felony murder, see COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 18-1-408(1)(a) (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-11-502(1) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-8(a)(1), (d)(1) (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
1-402(3)(a) (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.66(1)-(2) (West 1982).
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mines the propriety of such multiple convictions or suggests that felony
murder is justified under another theory.16'
6. Presuming Evidence of Required Offense Elements
Evidentiary theories posit that a culpable state of mind or a certain
objective element of an offense may be imputed rather than proven be-
cause additional facts suggest that these elements are indeed satisfied.
Thus, efficiency and ease in prosecution may be promoted without unduly
increasing the danger of convicting innocent persons.
The clearest instances of imputed objective elements based upon such
an evidentiary rationale appear as statutory presumptions and as posses-
sion and status offenses. In a Tennessee case, for example, the defendant
was charged with the offense of manufacturing whiskey.' At trial the
State relied in part upon a statutory presumption that established the ob-
jective elements of the offense from proof of possession or control of a
still."6 ' Apprehending an actor in the process of manufacture is difficult,
and such a presumption provides an evidentiary advantage that compen-
sates for such practical difficulties. It does not reject the significance of the
required objective element of manufacturing whiskey, but rather relies
upon the belief that usually where there is possession or control of a still,
there is the required manufacture or attempt to manufacture. Indeed, in
many such cases it is possible that the presumption is unnecessary: It is
likely that, even without the legal presumption, the circumstances of pos-
session and control themselves would lead the finder of fact to the conclu-
sion that the presumption directs.'64
161. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 433 A.2d 1025 (Del. 1981) (because legislature intended to au-
thorize separate convictions for felony murder and underlying felony, such convictions were permissi-
ble), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); State v. Crump, 232 Kan. 265, 654 P.2d 922 (1982) (convic-
tion for both felony and felony murder permitted); State v. Harris, 69 Wash. 2d 928, 421 P.2d 662
(1966) (rejecting doctrine of merger of underlying offense and felony murder). For a discussion of
other theories supporting felony murder, see infra p. 663-65.
162. Sesson v. State, 563 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1978).
163. Id. at 802-03. Numerous presumptions impute objective elements. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 265.15 (McKinney 1975) (every passenger of automobile in which firearm discovered pre-
sumptively guilty of possession of firearm); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-113.12 (1981) (presumption of
forgery of financial transaction cards from fraudulent possession of such cards); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-17-230 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (presumption of defacing flag from possession of defaced flag).
The doctrine of constructive possession also imputes objective elements. See generally Whitebread &
Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751,
761-62 (1972) (describing constructive possession as "a legal fiction used by courts to find possession
in situations where it does not in fact exist").
Similarly, the ru!e of joint possession may render the issue of actual possession immaterial by im-
puting possession to all persons found in the proximity of contraband, i.e., in a room or a car. Com-
ment, Possession of Narcotics in Pennsylvania: "Joint" Possession, 76 DICK. L. REv. 499, 508 (1972)
(describing Pennsylvania cases on joint possession as reaching same result as New York presumption
of possession of weapon in vehicle).
164. In Sesson v. State, 563 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1978), federal agents observed Sesson
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This explicit use of possession to presume the objective elements of a
manufacturing offense illustrates the implicit use of a similar presumption
in possession offenses. Many possession offenses represent codified pre-
sumptions that where there is possession, there also probably exists the
harm or evil that the possession offenses actually seek to prevent and pun-
ish. Possession of trace amounts of narcotics, for example, suggests past
use or distribution of narcotics."6 5 Possession offenses differ from statutory
presumptions, however, in that they preclude a defendant's rebuttal of the
presumption.
Offenses predicated on status similarly punish or prevent a harm or evil
other than that explicitly provided in the formal objective elements of the
offense. This is evident in "narcotics vagrancy statutes" such as that in
Ricks v. United States.'ee The result in Ricks, using a status offense, is
similar to those in cases charging possession of trace amounts of narcotics:
Both vagrancy and possession permit the state to punish the use or distri-
bution of narcotics, a goal that would otherwise be difficult or impossible
to attain. A similar rationale supports equivalent uses of other status of-
fenses, such as traditional vagrancy statutes designed to reach theft
,,offenses." 6 '
An analogous evidentiary rationale supports a variety of statutory pre-
sumptions that impute mental elements: The Model Penal Code, for ex-
ample, uses such a presumption in place of the traditional felony-murder
at the site of a still. To establish manufacturing, the state relied, in part, upon the presumption of
manufacturing from possession or control of a still. When Sesson argued on appeal that there was no
evidence that he was manufacturing whiskey, the court concluded that "[t]here could be no other
logical conclusion but that he was manufacturing or attempting to manufacture whiskey." Id. at 802.
165. See supra p. 626. The evidentiary rationale underlying possession offenses seems to punish
only past criminal behavior. Criminalizing possession to deterfuture criminal conduct, however, may
be justifiable under a nonculpability rationale. See infra pp. 671-72.
166. 228 A.2d 316 (D.C. 1967), re,'d, 414 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In Ricks, the defendants
were convicted of a status offense that punished one who: (1) is a narcotics user or has been convicted
of a narcotics offense; (2) has no lawful employment or visible means of support; (3) wanders about in
public places at late and unusual hours at night; and (4) fails to give a good account of himself. 414
F.2d at 1113 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-416 a(b)(1)(A), (C) (1967) (later repealed as unconstitu-
tional)). The defendants had previously been convicted of narcotics offenses, had old and new needle
marks on their arms, and had repeatedly been seen in the company of convicted prostitutes known to
be drug users. 228 A.2d at 318-19. The defendants in Ricks criticized the use of the narcotics va-
grancy statute as a "catch-all" designed to convict when no other offense could be proven. The trial
court did not dispute the defendants' characterization of the statute but defended its usefulness in
preventing and punishing past, planned, or attempted drug transactions that could not be proven. Id.
at 322.
167. It appears that such status offenses are sometimes used less for evidentiary advantage at trial
and more for an investigative advantage, as when a vagrancy offense is used to arrest a suspect for
questioning. See Foote, supra note 58, at 625 n.65 (reporting obvious instances of such abuse of
vagrancy statute). This use of vagrancy offenses permits charges for offenses that do not constitute a
criminal harm or evil to further an investigation of unproven or even unknown crimes. This use of the
substantive criminal law is inappropriate.
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rule. The mental state required for a murder conviction is presumed when
the death is caused in the course of certain felonies.
Strict liability offenses are the most common use of an evidentiary ra-
tionale for imputing mental elements.""8 In Flynn v. Galesburg,169 for ex-
ample, the defendant tavern owners were held liable for serving liquor to
a minor; proof of knowledge of the age of the customer was not re-
quired. 170 The court reasoned that it was the defendants' duty to deter-
mine a customer's age. Thus, when the defendants' agent sold liquor to a
minor, the sale raised the irrebuttable presumption that he did not investi-
gate carefully enough.17 1 This reasoning assumes that the actor knows of
his duty and is capable of performing it-the normal requirements for
punishing an omission. Such assumptions are frequently valid under the
circumstances in which strict liability is imposed.
17 12
Felony-murder statutes have similarly been justified on the theory that
most killings during felonies are in fact intentional, knowing, or reckless
under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of
human life.17' This being true, it is argued, prosecutors may be spared the
task of actually proving such culpability.
There is, then, an analogy between presumptions imputing elements of
an offense, on the one hand, and possession offenses, status offenses, strict
liability offenses, and felony murder, on the other. The analogy exists
both in their common functions of imputing required elements of the true
paradigm of the offense and in the evidentiary rationales used to support
them. Given this, one may question why the constitutional infirmities that
plague explicit presumptions do not also invalidate the less explicit codi-
fied presumptions.
The Supreme Court has held that a presumption, if employed, must be
168. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, § 31, at 218 (convictions for many strict
liability crimes would be difficult if fault element were included); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798,
299 P.2d 850 (1956) (legislature omitted culpability requirement for bigamy to alleviate prosecutor's
burden of proof, not to punish the blameless; defendant therefore permitted to establish a defense of
reasonable mistake); Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 375-76, 44 N.E. 503, 504 (1896)
(when particular fact implies knowledge of other elements of crime, or when actual knowledge is
difficult to prove, preliminary fact may constitute crime). See generally Paulus, Strict Liability: Its
Place in Public Welfare Offences, 20 GRIM. L.Q. 445, 449, 461 (1978) ("personnel in charge of
enforcement rarely prosecute unless they find an element of fault . . . present in the offence," and
thus in practice "the use of strict liability to prosecute morally blameless offenders is very rare").
169. 12 Il1. App. 200 (1883).
170. Id. at 201-02, 204.
171. Id. at 203.
172. "[Public welfare] offences presuppose a continuous activity, such as carrying on a business,
so that (a) special skill and attention may reasonably be demanded, and (b) if the law is broken there
will be a suspicion that it was a deliberate breach due to self-interest." G. WILusAMs, supra note 3, at
235.
173. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment at 36-37 (1980). Jurisdictions that limit felony
murder to enumerated felonies that are typically dangerous to human life take this position, see
authorities cited supra note 43.
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rebuttable." 4 Further, a mandatory presumption-one that the factfinder
must accept upon proof of the basic fact unless the defendant rebuts
it11 7 5-is permissible only if the evidence necessary to invoke the presump-
tion "is sufficient for a rational jury to find the inferred fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.117'  The requirements of the codified forms of imputa-
tion, or the special conditions under which they apply, frequently satisfy
this latter requirement. It is the likely connection between the proven fact
(e.g., possession) and the inferred fact (e.g., manufacture, distribution, or
use) that gives rise to the codified form in the first place. But none of the
codified forms of imputation noted above satisfies the first requirement; all
have the effect of creating irrebuttable presumptions. The possessor may
not prove that he did not intend to manufacture, distribute, or use; the
"narcotics vagrant" may not prove that he had no intention to buy, use, or
sell narcotics; the strict liability offender may not prove that his conduct
was faultless; and the felony-murder defendant may not prove that the
killing was entirely blameless. Logic suggests that the constitutional prin-
ciples limiting the use of explicit presumptions should apply to these anal-
ogous forms of imputation.
1 77
Doctrines relying upon evidentiary rationales for imputing objective or
174. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979); McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,
241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916).
175. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 161 (1979). In Allen, the majority distinguished
mandatory and permissive presumptions. It defined permissive presumptions as those that leave the
factfinder to reject or accept the fact proved as sufficient evidence of the fact presumed. Id.
176. Id. at 166; cf Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 524 (burden-shifting mandatory presump-
tion unconstitutional because it may have been interpreted to require defendant to rebut presumption
by preponderance of evidence without also requiring analysis of relationship between proved fact-a
voluntary act-and presumed fact-that one intends natural and probable consequences of his volun-
tary acts); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (burden-shifting presumption, rebuttable by
preponderance of evidence, held unconstitutional for failure to analyze relationship between fact
proved-intentional homicide-and fact presumed-intentional killing with malice and absent provo-
cation); Sheriff v. Boyer, 97 Nev. 599, 637 P.2d 832 (1981) (mandatory presumption of embezzlement
from failure to return rented vehicle 72 hours after lapse of rental agreement unconstitutional under
Mullaney). Permissive presumptions, see supra note 175, are not viewed as shifting the burden and
the validity of such presumptions is evaluated under less stringent tests. See Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. at 519 & nn.8-9 (noting that line of cases would have been relevant if instruction had
merely permitted jury to find that one intends natural consequences of voluntary act). Similarly,
where the presumption may be rebutted by introduction of minimal evidence, the presumption is
tested under the less stringent rules applied to permissive presumptions. See County Court v. Allen,
442 U.S. at 166-67 nn.28-29. In Allen, the Court split over the appropriate test for the validity of
permissive presumptions. The majority held that such presumptions are valid if the jury could ration-
ally find the presumed fact. Id. The dissenters argued that permissive inferences are valid only if the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact. Id. at 172 (Powell, J., dissenting).
On the effect of an invalid presumption, see Connecticut v. Johnson, 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983) (plurality
and dissent split over whether Sandstrom instruction could ever constitute harmless error).
177. It would seem absurd to think the legislature would be free to dispense with a culpability
element entirely but not be free to presume the same element. If this were so, the California bigamy
statute, discussed supra note 168, would be constitutional as written but unconstitutional as construed
even though the latter provided a means for establishing faultlessness and the former did not. See also
supra note 48 (irony of apparent unconstitutionality of MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980), which
allows a defendant to rebut a presumption of culpability as to a homicide committed during a felony).
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culpability elements reflect a common legislative and judicial view that the
effective operation of the criminal justice system has its limits, in the com-
petence of the jury to draw the proper inference from the evidence before
it, in the capacity of the trial process to present to the jury all pertinent
evidence, or in the ability of an investigation to reveal all evidence neces-
sary for full litigation of the existence of the required elements of the
offense. These limitations are very real. Society must frequently choose
between ineffective prosecution of dangerous offenders and unacceptably
intrusive investigative methods or evidentiary advantages for prosecutors.
Unfortunately, the doctrines and rules generated by these choices often
have broader ramifications than intended or desired. A rule that creates a
presumption of a required element under circumstances that suggest that
the element is present but cannot be proven-at least without violating
personal liberties-can sometimes impute the element where the presump-
tion is not in fact warranted. Such errors may be an inherent cost of all
evidentiary shortcuts, but certainly they should be minimized where possi-
ble. Thus, we should prefer rebuttable presumptions to conclusive pre-
sumptions. Specifically, felony murder, possession, status, and strict liabil-
ity offenses, and similar instances of conclusive presumptions, should
formally express the definitional elements of the real harm or evil at issue,
and defendants should have the opportunity to rebut the doctrines' pre-
sumption of the existence of these elements.
Still, we may have to accept some degree of error if we are to maintain
the effectiveness of prosecution that the doctrines of imputation create.
Some see conviction of a few innocent persons as the necessary price for
conviction of the numerous guilty and dangerous persons who could avoid
punishment without an overinclusive rule.1" 8 But in cases of clearly im-
proper conviction, the evidentiary rationale loses the appeal gained by ad-
herence to the culpability principle.I'"
This balancing of interests is complex. The tendency may be to debate
the value of increased deserved convictions as against the relative increase
in erroneous convictions for each doctrine of imputation supported by an
evidentiary rationale. Expansion or retraction of a rule of imputation,
however, is not the only possible reform. If the need for effective prosecu-
tion is significant, as in instances of food adulteration, for example, it may
178. See infra note 244.
179. As argued previously, every use of an evidentiary rationale must rely in part on non-
culpability rationales. See 2 NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM'N, THE NEW JERSEY
PENAL CODE: COMMENTARY: FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION
COMMISSION 158 (1971) (conceding impossibility of determining how many felony-murder convictions
were for homicides committed purposely, knowingly, or with extreme-indifference recklessness, but
accepting rule in all but limited circumstances in belief that rule is effective deterrent); supra p. 622.
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be better to tolerate more intrusive investigative procedures rather than to
tolerate more erroneous convictions.180
7. Presuming Evidence of Complicity
The same evidentiary rationales that underlie the imputation of re-
quired offense elements also support a variety of other rules and doctrines,
such as the complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule."' Application
here is different, however, since the presumption imputes not the elements
of the substantive offense, but rather the elements of complicity in the sub-
stantive offense, such as assistance or encouragement. Such evidentiary
presumptions also underlie the Pinkerton doctrine, 8" the natural and
probable consequence rule in complicity,1 83 vicarious liability,1 and lia-
bility of organizational officials.18 5
In each instance, the group nature of the activity may conceal an actor's
complicity in an offense. The private communications and tacit under-
standings possible in an ongoing relationship can hinder the proof of com-
plicity and its required culpable state of mind. Prosecutors frequently use
the special provisions supported by this evidentiary rationale to close the
evidentiary gap. 86 Such use is subject to the same criticisms as the felony-
180. See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDENT 214-15 (1978) (discussing relaxed requirements for legal searches of heavily regulated
industries).
181. For example, in People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
845 (1952), the court affirmed defendant's conviction for felony murder by employing an evidentiary
rationale to hold defendant liable for a death caused by a policeman during a gun battle. "When a
defendant deliberately engenders an affray, deliberately using therein a lethal weapon, it must be
considered to be within his intent that death should result from the affray as a natural and probable
consequence of his acts, where the death is directly attributable to the affray ... " Id. at 514-15, 52
N.W.2d at 204 (emphasis added).
182. The rules governing withdrawal from a conspiracy indicate the evidentiary rationale that
underlies the Pinkerton doctrine. "[O]ne who has joined a criminal conspiracy can only effectively
withdraw therefrom by some affirmative act bringing home the fact of his withdrawal to his confeder-
ates." Loser v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 30, 32, 177 P.2d 320, 321 (1947).
183. An evidentiary rationale seems particularly appropriate in a case like Commonwealth v.
Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947), where defendant and his co-felon "decided to go out and
rob a filling station or someplace," id. at 183, 53 A.2d at 738, armed themselves and participated in a
gun battle in which the gas station attendant died, id. at 184-85, 53 A.2d at 738-39. The defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder under the natural and probable consequence rule. Id. at 190-91,
53 A.2d at 741-42.
184. In Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N.E. 769 (1908), the court justified imposition of vicari-
ous liability upon a proprietor for an unlawful sale of oleomargarine by a store clerk whose employer
was not present. The court refused to allow defendant's claim of non-authorization as a defense. The
court believed that requiring the state to prove that the proprietor knew of, authorized, or consented to
the sale under such a rule might allow proprietors "easy escape." Id. at 550, 85 N.E. at 770. The
court also relied on the "community of interest" between employer and employee, id., to infer that the
employer "had [the illegal act] done by another." Id. at 552, 85 N.E. at 771.
185. See United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 871 (App. D.C. 1951) (error to dismiss information
against president of corporation operating restaurant because there was probable cause to believe that
corporation president knew of restaurant's illegal operation and either encouraged or permitted it).
186. As one court observed:
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murder rule and possession, status, and strict liability offenses. The pre-
sumptions of assistance or encouragement are irrebuttable and serve to
impute elements even in cases where the presumption may not be valid.
8. Deterring Criminal Conduct
Most criminal liability, including imputed liability, deters some crimi-
nal conduct. It usually does so within the confines of the culpability prin-
ciple. As one writer suggests, while purely utilitarian grounds may justify
the existence of a criminal justice system, principles of culpability are
nonetheless appropriate to guide the assignment of liability within that
system.187 There are several situations, however, in which furtherance of
the utilitarian goal of deterrence disregards principles of culpability188 and
many, if not most, of these instances involve imputed liability.
The most obvious case is strict liability. While evidentiary rationales
explain many instances of strict liability-the actor is probably culpable
even if his culpability is not proven-other instances are admittedly cases
where the actor is not in fact culpable. The law imposes liability here
largely to deter others who may contemplate criminal conduct or
omissions.
The same rationale supports a variety of rules and doctrines imputing
liability, including the rules governing voluntary intoxication, the aggra-
vation and complicity aspects of felony murder, the Pinkerton doctrine,
the natural and probable consequence rule in complicity, vicarious liabil-
ity, liability of officals within an organization, status offenses, and posses-
sion offenses. The following explanation of felony murder is typical:
[T]o require from the state actual and positive proof of specific authorization or actual knowl-
edge and acquiescence in a matter lying peculiarly within the secret knowledge of the two
concerned in the offense, will effectually block most convictions and open the way for success-
ful evasion through secret instructions and covert understandings.
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 433 Pa. 141, 143, 249 A.2d 316, 317 (defendant liquor licensee convicted of
violating statute prohibiting sale of liquor to minors, although not present at time sale was made),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 934 (1969).
187. See H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-9 (1968).
188. The felony-murder rule (at least in its broadest forms) imposes liability where the actor may
be faultless as to the resulting death; the purpose is deterrence. See infra note 237. Strict liability
offenses, by definition, have this capacity; again, deterrence is the goal. See Wasserstrom, supra note
66, at 736-37. There are a few instances of rejection of the culpability principle in addition to in-
stances of imputation. For example, a common modification of the duress defense that bars the claim
of duress where the defendant is coerced to commit homicide, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-906
(1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103-A (1983), has been explained as necessitated by
principles of deterrence. See R. PERKINS, supra note 83, at 952; see also 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 107 (1983) (arguing against duress defense in all cases because
where temptation to crime is strongest law should speak most emphatically). Several codes have re-
jected such limitations on the duress defense, on the ground that in some cases the coercive force may
be more compelling than the best of us could resist and that under such circumstances the actor is not
culpable. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 comment at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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[I]f experience shows, or is deemed by the law-maker to show, that
somehow or other deaths which the evidence makes accidental hap-
pen disproportionately often in connection with other felonies. . or
if on any other ground of policy it is deemed desirable to make spe-
cial efforts for the prevention of such deaths, the law-maker may
[place such acts] under a special ban. The law may, therefore, throw
on the actor the peril, not only of the consequences foreseen by him,
but also of consequences which, although not predicted by common
experience, the legislator apprehends."8 9
Constitutional approval of a deterrent rationale for strict liability offenses
might provide precedential support for its use in these other instances of
imputed liability. 9 It is ironic, however, that while the Court has re-
stricted the use of presumptions and other doctrines relying upon eviden-
tiary justifications,9 1 it has approved the use of the more objectionable
doctrines of imputed liability that rely upon deterrent rationales unrelated
to the defendant's culpability. In its concern for precise procedural fair-
ness, the Court may have lost sight of the more fundamental goal of en-
suring a just result; justice often depends more on substantive than on
procedural rules. Doctrines of imputed liability that disregard culpability
do not require a procedurally improper shift of the burden of persuasion,
but they engender what many consider a more objectionable substantive
result by violating the principle of culpability.
C. Significance of the Theory of Imputation for the Formulation and
Application of Rules Imputing Liability
A doctrine of imputation should be formulated and applied in a manner
consistent with the theory that justifies it. Therefore, if alternative theories
of imputation support a single doctrine, then the formulations of the doc-
trine, or the rules governing its application, should vary with the theory
that supports it. This form of analysis-comparing alternative formula-
tions of a doctrine with the alternative theories of imputation supporting
it-either may serve as a basis for criticizing identical formulations sup-
ported by inconsistent theories, or may serve to support and explain ap-
parently aberrational formulations of a doctrine. Such analysis is most re-
vealing in the substantive law of six areas: voluntary intoxication; the
aggravation of culpability in felony murder; the imposition of liability for
the crimes of a confederate; strict liability; offenses of status and of posses-
sion; and liability for an omission.
189. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1881) (emphasis added).
190. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (quoted infra pp. 669-70).
191. See supra pp. 654-55.
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1. Voluntary Intoxication
The rules imputing liability in cases of voluntary intoxication have been
rationalized under each of the theories for imputing liability. Under the
most persuasive rationale-a causal theory-an actor causes his own
criminal conduct by becoming intoxicated or at least creates a situation
that risks such criminal conduct."' 2
Both the cumulative1 93 and substituted equivalency justifications are
considerably less persuasive. Intoxication may sometimes be criminal or
quasi-criminal 94 but it does not justify any accumulation of culpability.
The substituted culpability theory is similarly unpersuasive because the
culpability of becoming intoxicated is rarely of the same degree as the
culpability being imputed to the actor. It is nonetheless frequently used.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code's intoxication provision, for exam-
ple, state:
We believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence between the
risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks cre-
ated by his conduct in becoming drunk. Becoming so drunk as to
destroy temporarily the actor's powers of perception and of judgment
is conduct which plainly has no affirmative social value to counter-
balance the potential danger. The actor's moral culpability lies in
engaging in such conduct.'9 5
Such unreasonable claims of equivalency 9" doubtless account for much of
the suspicion that falls upon other imputations based on equivalency
theories.
Equally unpersuasive are the evidentiary rationales that have been used
to support the imputation, rather than the proof, of a required mental
element under the rules governing voluntary intoxication. The commen-
tary to the Model Penal Code, for example, also justifies its rule on volun-
tary intoxication by relying upon
the impressive difficulties posed in litigating the foresight of any par-
ticular actor at the time when he imbibes . . . . These considera-
tions lead us to propose, on balance, that the Code declare that un-
192. See supra p. 639.
193. Aristotle refers to a rule by which the penalty for an offense is doubled in a case of drunken-
ness. ARISTOTLE, supra note 106, at 1113 b .
194. See R. PERKINS, supra note 83, at 888-92.
195. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
196. For a critique of the Model Penal Code's equation of drunkenness with recklessness, see
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-230 commentary at 234-35 (1976); P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMI-
NAL GUILT 193-95 (1963).
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awareness of a risk of which the actor would have been aware had
he been sober be declared immaterial.
197
Deterrent rationales have also been offered: "The facts are common-
place-indeed so commonplace that their very nature reveals how serious
from a social and public standpoint the consequences would be if men
could behave as the appellant did and then claim that they were not guilty
of any offence." '198 "[I]llogical as the outcome may be . . . [the rule on
voluntary intoxication is necessary] for the purpose of protecting the com-
munity . ..."'99
These alternative rationales for imputation under the rules governing
voluntary intoxication can explain many of the differences in the formula-
tions of the rules. The greatest differences exist in the degree of culpabil-
ity imputed. Many jurisdictions, especially those following the Model Pe-
nal Code, limit the doctrine to imputing recklessness20" and limit its
application to instances where the actor "would have been aware [of the
risk] had he been sober."' 0' Such limitations seem consistent with the
equivalency and evidentiary rationales. Voluntary intoxication may be
equivalent to the recklessness that this rule imputes. Similarly, proof of
voluntary intoxication arguably provides a basis for presuming the hard-
to-prove awareness of a risk that this rule imputes. Voluntary intoxication
is clearly inadequate, however, to show an equivalency with or to allow
the presumption of a higher level of culpability.
But under a deterrent rationale, a jurisdiction may well feel that imput-
ing all levels of culpable, 2 ' or admitting only a few narrow exceptions,
203
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The argument has
also been made in more sweeping form:
Many people get drunk but when honest people get drunk they do not go out and commit
crimes. In other words, you could say if a person committed a crime while drunk he must have
a criminal instinct in him because they say, as you probably know, that in a state of intoxica-
tion a person exhibits his true desires.
Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943, 948 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (quoting
trial court's statement to appellant's counsel refusing counsel's request that jury be instructed that
intoxication could make it impossible for defendant to form requisite intent), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
959 (1959).
198. Regina v. Majewski, [1975] 3 All E.R. 296, 299, aff'd sub norn. Director of Pub. Prosecu-
tions v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142.
199. Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142, 146.
200. Several jurisdictions have adopted the rule of imputation set forth in MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2(b) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
53a-7 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. § 501.020(3)-(4) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 37
(1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.076(1) (Vernon 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 II(c) (1974);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D.
CErr. CODE § 12.1-04-02 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.125(2) (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-2-306 (1978). For treatment of other jurisdictions, see infra notes 202-04, 209.
201. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
202. Several jurisdictions attempt to bar intoxication as a defense regardless of the state of mind
required by the offense. See McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151 (Miss. 1978) (defense available only
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or imputing all "general intents,"204 will provide greater deterrence than
would imputing only recklessness.20 5 As is frequently the case, the deter-
rent rationale may become more attractive when marginal, possibly illu-
sory, culpability exists, such as in the arguably immoral if not illegal con-
duct of voluntary intoxication.20 6
Pure causal theories for this doctrine are rare, as are formulations con-
sistent with such a theory. As discussed above, a purely causal theory
would suggest that the requirements for imputing liability under the doc-
trine of voluntary intoxication should be the same as the requirements for
imposing liability for causing crime by an innocent 207-i.e., the culpability
required by the definition of the offense present at the time the actor be-
comes voluntarily intoxicated.20 8
if intoxication renders defendant an automaton); State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328
(1977) (voluntary intoxication is defense only if it produces permanent insanity); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 421 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon 1974) (evidence of voluntary intoxication
only usable to mitigate penalty if intoxication produced temporary insanity).
203. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cobb, 379 Mass. 456, 405 N.E.2d 97 (exception only to mitigate
first-degree murder if it renders defendant mentally incapable of deliberate premeditation), vacated on
other grounds sub norn. Massachusetts v. Hurley, 449 U.S. 809 (1980); Commonwealth v. England,
474 Pa. 1, 20, 375 A.2d 1292 (1977) (intoxication lowers crime to lesser degree of murder but cannot
reduce murder to manslaughter); Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 814, 241 S.E.2d 756, 758
(1978) (drunkenness does not by itself render an actor incapable of forming requisite intent); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 193.220 (1981) (intoxication admissible only on questions of specific intent); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (Purdon 1983) (evidence of intoxication admissible where relevant to reduce
murder from higher to lower degree); S.D. CODIFIrD LAWS ANN. § 22-5-5 (1979) (when specific
intent is required jury may take defendant's intoxication into account); id. § 22-16-6 (if design to
effect death is shown, homicide will not be reduced from murder because of voluntary intoxication).
For a comprehensive list of authorities, see 1 P. ROBINsoN, supra note 2, at § 65(a).
204. Varnedare v. State, 264 Ark. 596, 573 S.W.2d 57 (1978) (state statute removing self-induced
intoxication as a defense does not prevent defendant from showing that his drunkenness was of such a
great degree that it negates specific intent); Harris v. United States, 375 A.2d 505 (D.C. 1977);
People v. Harkey, 69 Ill. App. 3d 94, 386 N.E.2d 1151 (1979); People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69
N.W.2d 140, 143 (1955); State v. Fox, 68 Ohio St. 2d 53, 428 N.E.2d 410 (1981); State v.
McGehearty, 121 R.I. 55, 394 N.E.2d 410 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(b) (West Supp. 1983)
(specific intent, or premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought required where specific intent
crime is charged); see I P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at § 65(a) (comprehensive list of authorities).
205. See State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 396 A.2d 1129 (1979). There, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reasoned: "The need to protect the public from the prospect of repeated injury and the public
policy demanding that one who voluntarily subjects himself to intoxication should not be insulated
from criminal responsibility are strongly supportive of [our rejection of voluntary intoxication as a
defense to all specific intent crimes]." Id. at 474, 396 A.2d at 1132. The court thus concluded that
voluntary intoxication would only be admissible to negate the premeditation and deliberation required
for first-degree murder. Id. at 482-83, 396 A.2d at 1136.
206. This rationale combines a crude and unpersuasive equivalency theory with a nonculpability
deterrent rationale.
207. See supra pp. 640-42.
208. For example, the'defense could be defined as follows:
(1) Evidence of intoxication, either voluntary or involuntary, may be admitted into evidence
to negate a culpability element of the offense.
(2) Although an actor's intoxication negates the existence of a culpability element at the
time of the offense, such element is nonetheless established if the actor satisfied such element
immediately preceding or during the time he was voluntarily becoming intoxicated or at any
time thereafter until commission of the offense, and the harm or evil that was intended, con-
templated, or risked, as the case may be, is brought about by the actor's subsequent conduct
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A few jurisdictions bar any imputation in cases of voluntary intoxica-
tion.2"9 The common explanation is that "intoxication at the time of the
conduct alleged [ought to be treated] the same as any other evidence bear-
ing on the defendant's conduct and state of mind." 10 These jurisdictions
view barring admission of evidence of intoxication as unprincipled and
illogical.2" But this reflects a mistaken belief that imputation of required
elements is per se improper. It fails to recognize the analogy between im-
putation in cases of voluntary intoxication and undisputed instances of
imputation. 1 2 As this Article seeks to demonstrate, imputation of the ele-
ments of an offense is not itself improper; the objection is only to imputa-
tion that does not have a proper basis. Whether a basis is proper depends,
first, upon the theories for imposing criminal liability on which the juris-
diction is willing to rely, and, second, upon the adherence of the doctrinal
formulation to the underlying theory of imputation.
2. The Aggravation of Culpability in Felony Murder
Causal, equivalency, evidentiary, and deterrence theories have all been
used to support the aggravation of culpability in felony murder. The vari-
ety of theories relied upon does much to explain the great variety of quali-
fications placed upon the doctrine.
The causal theories have been discussed previously: By committing a
felony, the actor intentionally creates the risk of an accidental killing.213 If
this theory of creation of risk justifies the felony-murder rule, then it is
appropriate to limit the rule's application to felonies that are in fact dan-
gerous.214 Logically, the defendant should also be liable for the death of
any actor within the scope of the risk he creates, whether those killed are
victims of the felony, innocent bystanders, police, or co-felons. 1 5
during intoxication.
209. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-230 (1) (1976).
210. Id. § 702-230 commentary at 234.
211. Id.; see authorities cited supra notes 3-4.
212. See supra pp. 640-42.
213. See supra pp. 643-44.
214. For jurisdictions adopting this view, see authorities cited supra note 43. The requirement of
an "inherently dangerous" felony does not, however, further this rationale where the dangerousness of
the crime is assessed in the abstract, i.e., is grand theft dangerous, rather than in the context of the
particular crime, i.e., is grand theft by a physician who recommends a life-threatening course of
treatment to extract a fee dangerous. See People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1966) (defendant's conduct in persuading child's parents to have her placed in defendant's
care and to forego lifesaving surgery constituted grand theft, but such theft was not inherently danger-
ous enough to trigger felony-murder rule); see also State v. Underwood, 228 Kan. 294, 615 P.2d 153
(1980) (status offense of possession of firearm by convicted felon not inherently dangerous enough to
serve as underlying felony).
215. For a summary of various positions on this issue, see supra note 129. In contrast, where an
equivalency theory based on the "transfer" of culpability is used to support the felony-murder rule,
liability depends upon the existence of transferable malice, and may well depend upon the status of
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Under an equivalency theory of substituted culpability, the intention to
commit the felony is transferred to the homicide as "'the legal equivalent
of and tantamount to' . . . a willful, deliberate and premeditated kill-
ing.''2 10 Imputation is also justified under an equivalency theory of cumu-
lative culpability: The actor is held liable for a single felony-murder of-
fense rather than for the underlying felony and the negligent or reckless
homicide.21 7 The choice between these equivalency theories affects the for-
mulation of the imputed liability doctrine. A theory of substituted culpa-
bility requires only culpability as to committing a felony; the doctrine will
apply even if the killing is entirely accidental.218 Under a cumulative-
culpability theory, however, there must be some additional culpability as
to the killing to aggregate with the culpability for the underlying felony if
the actor is to be liable for murder. Thus, under the latter theory, a juris-
diction is likely to require at least a negligent killing,219 or to add restric-
tions that tend to limit the doctrine to situations where the killing is in
fact negligent (e.g., restriction to dangerous felonies, to foreseeable deaths,
or to deaths caused "in furtherance of" the felony).220
The equivalency-through-cumulative-culpability rationale for the
felony-murder rule would also explain two other common limitations on
the rule. The first limitation, the merger doctrine, prevents application of
the felony-murder rule when the underlying felony is precisely the con-
duct causing death, such as an assault from which the victim later dies.22
the killer. See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981) (if killing of co-felon
by victim was not done with malice, no malice can be imputed to defendants).
216. State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 217, 117 P. 58, 61 (1911); see also Wooden v. Common-
wealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981) (malice inherent in robbery provides malice prerequisite
to finding that homicide was murder).
217. See supra p. 651.
218. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981) (murder in first degree is killing "committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony") (emphasis added). But see State v. Underwood, 228
Kan. 294, 615 P.2d 153 (1980) (construing statute to require commission of inherently dangerous
felony).
219. See supra note 44; infra p. 667.
220. See supra pp. 624-25. It can also be argued that even where the risk is small in terms of
probability, the seriousness of the harm risked (death) and the grossly unjustified nature of the
risktaking (the felony), transform even minor risk creation into negligence per se. See W. LAFAvE &
A. Scor, supra note 15, at 210 ("test for reasonableness in creating risk is thus said to be deter-
mined by weighing the magnitude of the risk of harm against the utility of the actor's conduct").
Professor Williams suggests that the risk involved in taking one gun from a group of one million guns,
only one of which is loaded, and firing it at another reasonable creature is unreasonable given the
total absence of social utility in the conduct. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 26, at 59-61; see W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF rHE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 291 (1965).
221. Blackstone's statement of the felony-murder rule suggests this limitation: "[Ilf one intends to
do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is also murder." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
39, at *200-01 (emphasis added). The law of many jurisdictions today explicitly requires that the
defendant engage in another felony distinct from the homicide itself. See supra p. 651. See generally
Annot., 40 A.L.R.3D 1341 (1971) (application of felony-murder doctrine where felony relied upon is
includable offense with homicide).
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In such a case there is only one offense and thus no basis for accumula-
tion. The requirement of an "independent felonious purpose" '222 and the
"caused in furtherance" requirement ensure that the two instances of cul-
pability are separate but related-the precise condition needed for ac-
cumulation. A second limitation, arising from concerns about double jeop-
ardy, prohibits consecutive sentences-sometimes even multiple
convictions-for both felony murder and the underlying felony. It reflects
the notion that the felony-murder rule takes into account the actor's cul-
pability for the underlying felony, and that an independent sentence for
that felony would punish the same offense twice.
An evidentiary justification for the felony-murder rule suggests restric-
tions that are similar to those discussed under causal theories. An eviden-
tiary theory would justify a felony-murder rule under the argument that
such killings probably are purposeful, knowing, or at least reckless under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human
life. The creation of risk to life for the purpose of engaging in a felony
manifests an actor's indifference to the value of human life. Under such
an evidentiary theory, the restrictions noted above,223 which focus liability
on improper risk creation, are appropriate.
A deterrence theory, aimed simply at discouraging killings during felo-
nies, suggests the fewest restrictions. It might demand that the killing be
avoidable, on the ground that unavoidable (e.g., purely accidental) killings
are not deterrable. But even this restriction is unnecessary if a general
rather than special deterrence theory is used. Punishing any killing during
a felony arguably serves the purpose of general deterrence by deterring
other felons or by at least making other felons more careful to avoid risks
of causing death. The only necessary restriction is the requirement that
the killing occur "in the course of" a felony.2
24
3. Liability for Crimes of Another
Several forms of imputed liability hold an actor liable for the crimes of
another: complicity, the Pinkerton doctrine, the complicity aspect of the
felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequence rule in com-
222. See People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 387, 491 P.2d 793, 801, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971);
State v. Rueckert, 221 Kan. 727, 734-35, 561 P.2d 850, 857-58 (1977); supra note 159.
223. See supra p. 664.
224. It is during this time that the general deterrent lesson is meant to apply. For jurisdictions
imposing this requirement and an "in furtherance of" requirement, see supra note 45. A jurisdiction
relying upon a nonculpability theory might well adopt some culpability-based restriction on the theory
that general deterrence can be maintained with a lower risk of erroneous convictions if such restric-
tions are added. Still, nonculpability theory does not demand such restrictions. See People v. Johnson,
28 Cal. App. 3d 653, 104 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972) (because felony-murder rule is designed to deter all
killings, liability for accidental homicide committed during course of felony was appropriate).
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plicity, vicarious liability, and liability of officials within an organization.
Several theories have been used to justify each imputation. Under a causal
theory-where the actor should be liable because he either directly caused
the other's criminal conduct or created the dangerous situation in which
the other's criminal conduct was more likely-a jurisdiction is likely to
restrict these doctrines in a way that requires a strong causal connection
to, and culpability as to causing, the criminal conduct. Causal theories
would, for example, explain the common restrictions on the Pinkerton
doctrine and the felony-murder rule that the offense be "in furtherance
of" the group's enterprise225 and "reasonably foreseeable."22
Equivalency theories of cumulative culpability would also support these
doctrines. The culpability inherent in the ongoing conspiracy or joint fel-
ony may be added to the recklessness or negligence as to the commission
of an offense by a confederate, thereby justifying liability for the confeder-
ate's offense under the imputation doctrines of Pinkerton, the natural and
probable consequence rule, and the complicity aspect of the felony-murder
rule.22 7 Once that culpability has been accumulated, however, it no longer
forms an independent basis for liability for the joint criminality.228 The
punishment of such group criminality through punishment for a confeder-
ate's offense explains limitations barring consecutive sentences or multiple
convictions for conspiracy and the object offense, 2 9 for complicity in the
substantive offense and complicity in another offense which was its natu-
ral and probable consequence, 23 and for the underlying felony and a fel-
225. See, e.g., supra notes 23 (Pinkerton), 44-45 (felony murder).
226. This limitation is supported by dicta in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946),
warning that:
A different case would arise if the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was
not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful
project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably
foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlauful agreement.
Id. at 647-48 (emphasis added). Even where this limitation is applied, however, the Pinkerton doc-
trine allows conviction for substantive offenses without satisfaction of either the actus reus or mens rea
element of the substantive offense. The "reasonably foreseeable" limitation only requires negligence as
to the substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators, and wherever the definition of the offense
requires greater culpability, the culpability is imputed. See United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 309
(5th Cir. 1980); State v. Stein, 70 N.J. 369, 360 A.2d 347 (1976) (defendant conspirator held liable
for reasonably foreseeable consequences of conspiracy even though they were not in contemplation of
conspirators at time of agreement). Several states have codified similar limitations. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.05(2) (West 1964); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (Vernon 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.05(2)(c) (West 1982); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(b)(2)-(3) (1977).
227. See State v. Rosania, 33 N.J. 267, 163 A.2d 139 (1960) (relying on defendant's contribution
to armed robbery and circumstances indicating that defendant, who planned robbery, knew that inno-
cent persons would be present and that guns would be employed; court concluded that in "such a
situation" by "aiding in the robbery" he was as culpable as one who fired shot).
228. See supra pp. 651, 664-65.
229. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:1-8(a)(2) (West 1982); 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at § 84.
230. The natural and probable consequence rule is often applied to impute liability for a greater
offense where complicity in the lesser offense is established but not punished. See cases cited supra
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ony murder committed by a co-felon.231 A causal theory, in contrast,
would not support such multiple offense limitations.
A cumulative-culpability theory, however, does not justify doctrines in
which the basis for the actor's liability for the crimes of another is not
necessarily criminal in itself. Such doctrines include vicarious liability and
liability of organizational officials.232
Evidentiary theories can also support the complicity aspect of felony
murder.2"' An evidentiary theory should foster rules that limit imputation
to situations where the requirements of complicity are probably satisfied.
For example, many states provide a special defense to the complicity as-
pect of felony murder if the accomplice:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, re-
quest, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof;
and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, arti-
cle or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-
abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other partici-
pant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious
physical injury.2
34
Without requiring proof of complicity in murder, such provisions provide
a defense if the defendant can in effect prove that he was not an accom-
plice to murder. This approach, however, shifts the burden of persuasion
to the defendant to negate elements essential to his liability as an accom-
plice-the culpable mental state as to assisting and encouraging the homi-
cide, the requisite culpability as to the homicide, and the assistance and
encouragement typically required to establish liability as an accomplice.2 35
note 24.
231. See supra note 160.
232. For example, where an employer hires an irresponsible worker, this is not an offense and
this neglect should not be cumulated. There is evidence of cumulation, however, in certain offenses
that require a failure to perform a duty imposed by law-at least where that failure is an offense. See
statutes cited supra note 27.
233. See supra p. 657.
234. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 122.25(3)(a)-(d) (McKinney 1975). Because negligence requires an
unreasonable lack of awareness of a risk, see N.Y. PENAL CODE § 15.05(4) (McKinney 1975), subsec-
tions (c) and (d) effectively excuse defendants who were not at least negligent as to the homicides.
Accord ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(b)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1502(2) (1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54c(A)-(D) (1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(3) (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (Supp. 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.115(2)(a)-(e) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(c) (1977).
235. For a discussion of these requirements, see supra pp. 637-38. For a discussion of the condi-
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Courts have held this sort of burden-shifting device unconstitutional in
many analogous instances of imputation.23
Finally, deterrence theories have been offered to support some of these
doctrines as devices to discourage the underlying criminal con-
duct-conspiracy, complicity, or joint felonies-and to encourage all mem-
bers of the enterprise to minimize further criminal conduct by other mem-
bers.2 37  The first use-deterring the underlying conduct-has no
application where the doctrine does not require underlying criminal con-
duct, as with vicarious liability and liability of officials within an organi-
zation. And where the underlying conduct is criminal, the doctrines are
unnecessary because liability already attaches to that criminal conduct and
thereby serves as a deterrent.2 8  The second use-deterring further of-
fenses by other members-is the more persuasive justification. If all actors
are strictly liable for homicides committed by their co-felons, they might
police one another to minimize the dangers of negligent and accidental
killings in the course of the felony. A deterrence theory for these doctrines
leads to few, if any, restrictions.2"9 Thus, it seems likely that this is the
theory relied upon in those jurisdictions that adopt the relatively un-
restricted common law form of co-felon liability.
2 40
tions necessary for such imputation, see Robinson & Grall, supra note 10, at 736-44.
236. See supra p. 655.
237. "The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or acciden-
tally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit." People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d
777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965). Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587
(1961) (dual convictions for conspiracy and for underlying offense), similarly concludes:
Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has
embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the
original purpose for which the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy
generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the
enterprise.
Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
238. In Washington, the State argued for imposition of felony-murder liability where the victim of
the robbery killed defendant's accomplice on the theory that the felony-murder rule is designed to
deter robbery. 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445. The court rejected the
argument, stating that any deterrence of robbery derived from felony-murder liability would be hap-
hazard at best. Id. The court concurred with Oliver Wendell Holmes' assessment: "To 'prevent steal-
ing, [the law] would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot."' Id. (quoting 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 58 (1881)).
239. For an explanation of this conclusion, see supra note 224. But see People v. Washington, 62
Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) (deterrence rejected as rationale
for holding felon liable for death caused by third party).
240. Federal courts, for example, punish conspiracy on the basis of the harm of criminal combina-
tion. See supra note 237. They punish for both conspiracy and the offenses that are its object. Id.
They apply the Pinkerton doctrine. See supra notes 23, 226. And they often apply the natural and




Strict liability, including vicarious liability and liability of officials
within an organization, is frequently justified under causal, evidentiary, or
nonculpability theories. A causal theory justifies strict liability because the
defendants have created a dangerous situation. This theory holds that
those who profit from engaging in potentially dangerous business ought to
ensure the safety of others. "The requirements of foresight and vigilance
imposed [by the duty to implement measures that ensure safety] are...
perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a
right to expect of those . . . whose services and products affect the...
well-being of the public that supports them." 24
Under an evidentiary theory, the doctrines imposing strict liability are
frequently limited so as to increase the likelihood that the defendant was
at least negligent. Limiting strict liability to high-risk activities or busi-
nesses that require special skills or involve familiar hazards increases the
likelihood that those involved are aware of the risks and hazards, can per-
form with the requisite skill, and, if a mishap occurs, are in fact negligent.
Of such offenses Justice Jackson said: "The accused, if he does not will
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than
society might reasonably expect .... ""'
Strict liability offenses 243 and strict liability imposed under the doctrines
of vicarious liability244 and liability of officials within an organization 5
have also been justified under a deterrence theory. The rule under this
rationale is "proceed at your own risk":
[The] manifest purpose [of strict liability for failure to comply with
regulations] is to require every person dealing in [dangerous sub-
stances] to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes
within the inhibition. . . and if he sells the [dangerous substance] in
ignorance of its character, to penalize him. Congress weighed the
241. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
242. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
243. As Professors LaFave and Scott have noted in explaining the rationale for strict liability
offenses: "If the conduct to be stamped out is harmful enough, or if the number of prosecutions to be
expected is great enough, the legislature may thus wish to make the absence of fault no defense, in
order to relieve the prosecution of the task of going into the matter." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 15, at 222.
244. As Sayre has suggested with regard to instances of vicarious liability: "The law's aim is not
reformatory, but almost exclusively deterrent, to prevent future repetitions of similar offenses." Sayre,
supra note 79, at 720, 722.
245. The Court in Park observed of the statute imposing liability:
[I]n providing sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who execute the corporate mis-
sion. . . the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they
occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations
will not occur.
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
The Yale Law Journal
possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against
the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug,
and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be
avoided.24
The evidentiary and deterrence theories both support strict liability
where the actor probably is at least negligent.247 In situations where the
defendant is probably not culpable, the two theories suggest divergent re-
sults: An evidentiary theory would bar liability because of the absence of
culpability, but a deterrence theory would impose it nonetheless.
Thus, causal and evidentiary theories, in their commitment to the cul-
pability principle, appeal to fairness; a nonculpability theory, in its
greater capacity for general deterrence, appeals to practicality. The ten-
sion between these goals explains the continuing controversy over the
proper restrictions to be placed upon strict liability. In Dotterweich2 4' and
Park, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that strict liability may
be imposed only where the defendant stands "in a responsible relation" to
the harm or danger.249 The restriction is a classic device in both causal
and evidentiary theory, designed to establish causal responsibility through
risk creation, or at least to increase the likelihood that an actor held liable
is in fact culpable even though proof of his culpability is not formally
required. Indeed, the dissent in Park characterizes the majority opinion as
requiring proof of negligent risk creation:
As I understand the Court's opinion, it holds that in order to sustain
a conviction under § 301(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act the prosecution must at least show that by reason of an
individual's corporate position and responsibilities, he had a duty to
use care to maintain the physical integrity of the corporation's food
products. A jury may then draw the inference that when the food is
found to be in such condition as to violate the statute's prohibitions,
that condition was "caused" by a breach of the standard of care im-
posed upon the responsible official. This is the language of negli-
gence, and I agree with it.
2 50
The causal theory explains another limitation imposed by the Park
246. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
247. See Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N.E. 769 (1908) (because distribution of impure or
adulterated food is perilous to human life ard health, one who sells any article interdicted by law does
so at his peril, and impliedly undertakes to exercise whatever degree of care is necessary to secure
compliance with law).
248. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
249. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-73 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 281, 285 (1943).
250. 421 U.S. at 678-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contending that majority's position properly
requires negligence as standard but improperly applies that standard in holding Park liable).
670
Vol. 93: 609, 1984
Imputed Criminal Liability
Court. Liability may not be imposed where the defendant is "powerless"
to prevent or correct the violation.251 The causal theory requires proof of
the defendant's power to prevent or correct, not only to increase the likeli-
hood of negligence but also to ensure that the defendant is held accounta-
ble only for dangers that he creates through his activity and has the power
to avoid. As the Park Court summarized: "The theory upon which re-
sponsible corporate agents are held criminally accountable for 'causing'
violations of the act permits a claim that a defendant was 'powerless' to
prevent or correct the violation . *. . .""' Neither an evidentiary nor a
deterrence theory would admit such a claim; the evidentiary rationale
would deduce "power to prevent" from responsibility, and a general de-
terrent rationale would consider such power-or its absence-
irrelevant.
2 53
5. Status and Possession Offenses
Status and possession offenses frequently punish harms other than those
defined on the face of the relevant statute. An evidentiary theory, of
course, supports such liability for an unproven harm or evil since circum-
stances suggest that the actor has committed or is about to commit the
unproven act. 2 "
Deterrence theories also have been used to justify status and possession
offenses as a means of discouraging possible independent future crimes.2 5
In discussing a statute outlawing the possession of a blackjack, for exam-
ple, one court showed that it was really concerned with future use, not
current possession:
[T]here is impressed upon slung-shots [sic], sandbags, black-jacks,
251. Id. at 673 (majority opinion).
252. Id. (quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964)).
253. There is little rationale for such restrictions in a jurisdiction relying upon a general deter-
rence theory. Yet the greater potential for convicting innocent persons increases the need for provisions
barring imprisonment upon conviction under strict liability. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 .05(2)(a)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); supra p. 628 (discussing treatment of strict liability under current
statutes).
254. See supra p. 653. Where the evidentiary rationale is used to support liability for future acts,
it is imputing the elements of attempt.
255. For example, one court noted:
The obvious intent of the legislature in enacting . . . the vagrancy statute was to enable law
enforcement officers to keep the streets clear, at late and unusual hours of the night, of those
persons who, by reason of being bent upon serious mischief, theft, or burglary, have no visible
or lawful business or mission in the locality ....
'And their purpose is to subject persons whose habits of life are such as to make them
objectionable members of society, to police regulations promotive of the safety or good order of
the community in which they are found.'
State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 770, 175 P.2d 633, 637-38 (1946) (quoting 66 C.J.S. Vagrancy § 2
(1934)), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 748 (1947). The reasoning applies with equal validity to posses-
sion offenses. See infra p. 672.
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and metal knuckles the indubitable indicia of criminal purpose. To
every person of ordinary intelligence these instruments are known to
be the tools of the brawl fighter and cowardly assassin and of no
beneficial use whatever to a good citizen or to society. The Legisla-
ture may take note of and act upon such common facts . . . . It
follows that, if the beneficial use of a thing is entirely lacking or
grossly disproportionate to its harmful use, the police power may
absolutely prohibit its possession.2 6
As with strict liability, the major controversy here is whether the imputa-
tion inherent in status and possession offenses should rely on an eviden-
tiary or a deterrence theory for support. The deterrence theory is more
compelling here than in most other doctrines of imputation. Not only does
liability generally deter possession by other potential felons, but it also
helps prevent commission of the true harm sought to be prevented,
"brawling," by the actor at hand. This theory supports broadly defined
offenses of status and of possession to provide the greatest deterrent effect.
Legislatures have apparently been heavily influenced by this theory and
have enacted a host of such statutes.257
An evidentiary theory, in contrast, would suggest restricting liability to
those cases where the defendant probably has committed or is about to
commit an offense. The increasing demands for specificity in vagrancy
statutes,258 for example, reflect such restrictions. By requiring more speci-
ficity, courts force the legislature to identify the real harm or evil it wishes
to prevent and to state conditions that more closely relate to those harms
or evils. 59 Such specificity provides a stronger basis for presuming the
elements of an offense or an attempt to commit an offense.2 60
6. Liability for Omissions
Cases that impose liability for an omission have sometimes been justi-
fied upon a causal theory. Indeed, such cases factually overlap with other
instances of imputation governed by causal theories. Where an actor sets
in motion, through another person or instrumentality, a force that then
threatens a harm or evil that the actor has an opportunity to prevent, he is
liable under either pure causation theory for directly or indirectly causing
256. People v. Ferguson, 129 Cal. App. 300, 304, 18 P.2d 741, 742 (1933).
257. See authorities cited supra pp. 626-28.
258. See Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
259. The "narcotics vagrancy" statutes nicely illustrate this need for greater specificity. See supra
p. 653.
260. See Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Village of Hoff-
man Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495-97 (1982) (drug parapher-
nalia statutes not overbroad when directed at stopping clearly illegal activity).
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the crime, or under a theory of omission for his failure to intervene fol-
lowing his creation of the danger.2 61
Courts have analyzed omission cases as instances of direct causation
even where the actor clearly makes no physical causal contribution. In
Palmer v. State,2"2 for example, the defendant failed to protect her child
from beatings by her paramour. The court sustained the trial judge's con-
clusion that "her gross and criminal negligence was a contributing cause
of [the child's] unfortunate death."2 6 ' In other cases, where natural forces
are the physical cause of the harm, courts similarly impute the force and
its effect to the actor. In Territory v. Manton,2" for example, the court
held a husband liable for allowing his wife to freeze in the snow:
The very volition of the defendant which led him to refuse aid to his
wife, when the law imposed the duty upon him to protect her, is
transferred to the violence of the elements, and he is made to use
their forces, and hence is responsible for the death they immediately
caused.
26 5
But use of such a causal theory to justify omission liability appears
strained. Only in a purely legal sense is Manton "made to use" the forces
of nature to cause the death of his wife. Such a causal analysis of omission
cases, with its chains of cause-and-effect, can only be confusing where
261. In Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932) (per curiam), error dismissed,
205 Ind. 194, 186 N.E. 293 (1933), for example, the defendant abducted, raped, and wounded a
young woman. "[I1n great distress of mind and body," id. at 150, 179 N.E. at 636, she swallowed
poison; he refused to help her and she died. The indictment charged murder by omission, owing to his
failure to administer the antidote or call for medical help, and charged murder by commission, for
causing her to become so distraught as to administer the poison by creating her great mental distress.
Id. at 145-49, 179 N.E. at 635-36. Thus, the indictment reflected a pure theory of omissions, i.e., one
might attribute imposition of the duty to act to defendant's creation of the situation. The indictment
also reflected a causing-crime-by-an-innocent theory.
Altering the facts of Stephenson, one can see an overlap between omission and complicity. Suppose
that the defendant had not rendered the woman irresponsible but that she nonetheless freely chose to
end her life rather than bear the memory of her ordeal. In that case, the defendant's guilt might be
analyzed under a theory of accomplice liability-he did not cause an innocent to commit suicide but
rather aided and encouraged her suicidal act by committing a felony against her, the natural and
probable consequence of which was, arguably, her suicide. Others have suggested an analytical simi-
larity between cases which impose duties to act and those which impose accomplice liability. See S.
KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 626-27 (4th ed. 1983).
262. 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960).
263. Id. at 353, 164 A.2d at 474.
264. 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888).
265. Id. at 107, 19 P. at 392. Similarly, in State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167
(1971), parents were convicted of manslaughter because they had failed to provide their child with
medical care. Occasionally, a defendant's failure to take precautions against foreseeable dangers may
subject him to liability for an omission when natural forces-such as fire or storm at sea-cause death
that would not have occurred if the defendant had taken the necessary safety precautions. See United
States v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430 (D.N.J. 1976) (storm); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316
Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) (fire).
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"causation" means, if anything, something entirely different than it does
in commission cases. Causation through an omission exists only in a tech-
nical "but-for" sense, not as a physical cause-and-effect.
Further, the but-for requirement has dramatically different effects in
omission and commission cases. An actor may kill a child by commission
by smothering it with a pillow, or by omission by not feeding it. The
actor's failure to feed the child is, admittedly, a but-for cause of the child's
death. The problem here, and with causation by omission generally, is
that every other person in the world also satisfies the but-for cause re-
quirement; "but for" the omission of every one of us, the child would not
have died.
The but-for cause requirement is therefore nearly useless for determin-
ing liability for an omission. To identify who should be held responsible
for the child's death by starvation, the law must instead rely upon the
proximate cause (or "remoteness") requirement, the culpable state-of-
mind requirements of the offense, and most importantly, the omission lia-
bility requirements of duty268 and of capacity-to-perform.261
One can avoid the misleading and strained analysis of causation theory
by relying instead upon an equivalency theory. The failure to perform a
duty of which one is capable is as culpable as causing the harm or evil by
affirmative conduct. Liability for the omission to perform a duty lies "in
the volitional element, the spiritual rebellion underlying and accompany-
ing the omission."26 8 Thus, the culpability of the omission conforms gen-
erally with the culpability of a comparable affirmative act. 269 While other
explanations exist, the most common statement of the equivalency theory
of omissions simply equates an act with the omission to perform a duty. 70
266. See 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at § 87.
267. See id. at § 86.
268. Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REv. 615, 616 (1942). Bentham focuses on
this culpability rationale for omissions when he argues:
A woman's head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a man, instead of assisting to quench the
fire, looks on and laughs at it. A drunken man, falling with his face downwards into a puddle,
is in danger of suffocation: lifting his head a little on one side would save him: another man
sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of gunpowder lies scattered about a room: a man is going
into it with a lighted candle: another, knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is
there that in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 323 n.1 (2d
ed. 1879).
269. One court explained: "Usually wanton or reckless conduct consists of an affirmative act...
in disregard of probable harmful consequences to another. But where. . . there is a duty of care...
wanton or reckless conduct may consist of intentional failure to take such care in disregard of the
probable harmful consequences. . . ." Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 397, 55 N.E.2d
902, 909 (1944) (improper fire safety precautions resulting in many deaths).
270. For example, the Supreme Court of Delaware equated acts and omissions in this way:
An act, lawful in itself, but negligently done, is an unlawful act. . . .One apparently inactive
is actually doing something, even though that something is the abstinence from doing some-
thing else that he ought to have done. Even sleeping is an efficient act, and may become the
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But it is rare that even this general equivalence of act and omission is
explicitly stated.
2 71
Reliance upon an equivalency theory avoids the confusion of traditional
causation analysis, and more properly focuses upon the duty and the ca-
pacity-to-perform requirements to determine whether the actor is as cul-
pable as one who affirmatively causes the forbidden harm or evil.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The definition of an offense describes the elements normally required to
hold an actor liable for the offense; it is that offense's paradigm for liabil-
ity. Despite the absence of required elements of the definition, an actor
may be held liable for the offense if a doctrine serves to impute the absent
elements. Such a doctrine does not alter the definition of an offense but
rather provides an alternative means of establishing the required elements,
or at least an alternative means of treating the defendant as if the re-
quired elements were satisfied. For the most part, the principles underly-
ing imputation reflect concerns beyond those of the offense at hand. A
single doctrine of imputation may apply to a range of offenses or to all
offenses. As a group, instances of imputed liability play as significant a
role in criminal law theory as do general defenses.
Although they represent a single conceptual group, the instances of im-
puted liability rely upon a variety of different theories and rationales. The
causal/equivalency/evidentiary/nonculpability structure used in this Arti-
cle to distinguish these theories and rationales approximates our intuitive
assessment of the rationales for imputation and provides the basis for a
logical and consistent theoretical framework.
The resulting framework enables us to derive a series of practical im-
plications. First, the conceptualization of imputed liability identifies sev-
eral offenses that resemble codified forms of imputation. This perspective
suggests both criticisms and justifications for such offenses. Second, the
conceptualization permits comparative analysis of a host of doctrines that
reveals unjustifiable inconsistencies and suggests necessary reforms. Fi-
object of penal prosecution when it operates to interrupt an act on the part of the defendant
which the law requires of him with the penalty of prosecution for his disobedience ....
Failing to look when required by duty to look is likewise an efficient act.
State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 20, 187 A. 609, 617 (1937); see Regina v. White, [1871] 1 L.R.-Cr. Cas.
Res. 311, 313 (opinion of Bovill, C.J.) (equating father's failure to remove child from street with act
of abandonment).
271. Even the Model Penal Code, which defines "conduct" to mean "an action or omission," fails
to give a justification for the equivalency in the Commentary to this definition and to the general
omission provisions. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13(5), 2.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (em-
phasis added).
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nally, analysis of an instance of imputed liability in light of the alternative
rationales that support it dictates rules that comport with those rationales.
The conceptual framework should also be useful whenever new issues
of imputed liability arise. It can give an initial sense of how the issue fits
into the larger picture. Such a perspective in turn can provide general
insights into the nature of the rule at issue and, by inviting analogies to
doctrines with a similar basis, can suggest new comparisons and analyses.
Some writers believe that "criminal law exhibits few unifying doctrinal
patterns. 27 12 Any apparent theoretical framework ii flawed, this view sug-
gests, because it cannot reflect the complex dynamic considerations that
really shape the doctrinal structure of the substantive law-"rules of pro-
cedure and evidence [as well as] social, economic, and political circum-
stances. 1 7 3 This school of thought seems to question whether there should
be a theory of criminal law.
I believe not only that unifying doctrinal patterns exist, but that the
health of the criminal justice system depends upon discovering these pat-
terns and using them to formulate principles of criminal liability that
more closely comport with our collective notions of justice.2 7' This Article
offers such a conceptual framework derived from doctrinal patterns in one
area of criminal law. This analysis might prove wanting in practice, but
such weaknesses are the stimulants for refinement. The process of discov-
ery of doctrinal patterns, conceptual generalization, criticism, and refine-
ment is, I believe, the most promising path to a rational, consistent, and
inherently just criminal law.
272. Schulhofer, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 181, 187 (1980).
273. Id. at 188. Similar views on the futility of discovering or organizing general principles of
liability may also underlie criticism of the attempts to define criteria for mental responsibility and
culpability. See P. BRrr, supra note 196, at 70-85.
274. As I have argued in more detail elsewhere, social, economic, and political circumstances are
significant determinants of when criminal law doctrine will increase in sophistication and even of
important details of its precise formulation. I believe, however, that there is a common intuitive sense
that binds all people of Western societies. "That [intuitive] judgment may become more developed in
an enlightened society, but it is not so fickle as to be a product of the current social context. Rather, it
is a major contributor to that social context, manifested in the criminal law as well as other social
institutions." Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
815, 849 (1980). It is this common intuitive sense that I and others seek to approximate through the
refinement of criminal law theory. I take others' belief that no fundamental doctrinal patterns exist
only as evidence that the quest has suffered from neglect. American criminal law scholarship has now
taken up the challenge. See G. FLErcHER, supra note 28; J. HALL, supra note 63.
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